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This dissertation studies strategies to mitigate the risks associated with
operational and strategic decisions of a firm, particularly focusing on project
management, product development and procurement decisions. In the first
essay we develop two simulation-based methods to evaluate risky capital in-
vestment projects that involve managerial flexibility. Many risky projects are
characterized by significant demand and operational risks (such as learning
curve uncertainty) that are difficult to capture by simple stochastic processes.
We propose using system dynamics simulations to estimate the cash flow re-
sulting from these projects and build upon prior work on real options valuation
in the decision analysis literature to develop two valuation algorithms. In the
second essay we explore the technology investment decisions for platforms in
markets that exhibit cross-network effects. We focus on the trade-off firms
must make between investing new product development resources to increase
a platform’s core performance and functionality versus investments designed
viii
to leverage the platform’s cross-network effects. Abstracting from examples
drawn from multiple industries, we use a strategic model to gain intuition
about how to make such trade-off decisions under competition. In the third
essay, we analyze the optimal procurement strategy of a firm that faces sup-
ply and demand risk. In particular, the firm can source from two unreliable
suppliers with different delivery characteristics. We study the optimal order
allocation policy shaped by the trade-offs between delivery leadtime, reliabil-
ity and procurement cost. Further, we discuss the value of leadtime flexibility
in supply risk mitigation and highlight the role of an inferior supplier in a
firm’s multi-sourcing strategy. The main contribution of this dissertation to
the operations management literature is two-fold. First, it illustrates the role
of effective risk mitigation through operational strategies of leadtime flexibility
and supply diversification as well as through recognizing managerial flexibility.
Second, it highlights the importance of leveraging third-party content develop-
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Risk mitigation is inherently a vital feature of operations management.
With rapidly changing global markets and the increasing complexity of sup-
ply chains, effective mitigation of operational risks has gained further signifi-
cance. In this dissertation, we consider some non-traditional methods of risk
mitigation including purchasing real options to expand capacity, the use of
diversified supply portfolios and the use of platform design to secure sufficient
third party development. In particular, we study risk mitigation through op-
erational strategies of leadtime flexibility and supply diversification as well as
through recognizing managerial flexibility. Further, we examine the role of
product development strategy in “getting both sides on board” in a two sided
market.
In the first essay we develop two simulation-based methods to evaluate
capital investment projects that involve managerial flexibility. Many impor-
tant risky projects are characterized by significant demand and operational
risks (e.g. learning curve uncertainty) embedded in non-linear feedback struc-
tures. Simple stochastic processes that are often used to value financial op-
tions may not capture the complex real-world behavior of these uncertainties.
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We propose using system dynamics (SD) methodology to model the project
uncertainty in order to take advantage of this methodology’s capabilities in
modeling complex feedback systems. The goal is improve the accuracy of the
ultimate valuation by increasing the realism of the project model. Specifically,
we use system dynamics simulations to estimate the cash flow resulting from
risky projects and build upon prior work on real options valuation in the de-
cision analysis literature to develop two valuation algorithms. We illustrate
these algorithms with a model drawn from the wind power industry, which is
characterized by numerous uncertainties and high managerial flexibility.
The first algorithm we propose, the SD-based decision tree approach,
is based on transforming the system dynamics model of the project into an
approximate decision tree that accounts for the managerial flexibility and then
evaluating the tree using the risk adjusted discount rate. The second one,
the diffusion approximation approach, involves approximating the cash flow
uncertainty generated by the system dynamics simulations with a binomial
decision tree and then evaluating the tree using risk-neutral valuation. We
discuss the differences between these two approaches and describe under what
conditions each one might be a more appropriate choice.
In the second essay, we examine the development of platforms in two-
sided markets characterized by strong cross-network effects. Two-sided mar-
kets consist of one or more platforms that facilitate interactions between dis-
tinct groups of users. Examples include some of the most important industries
in the economy such as video-game platforms, credit cards, cell phones, auc-
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tion sites and operating systems. The distinguishing characteristic of two-sided
markets is that the number of users on one side of the market depends on the
number of users on the other side. For example, video-game developers will
develop games for a platform only if the platform has a sufficiently large in-
stalled base. Likewise, all else being equal, gamers will prefer platforms with
a greater variety of games. The presence of these “cross-network effects” often
requires different strategies than those developed for traditional products and
services.
In many cases, manufacturers of platforms in these two-sided markets
face a trade-off between developing a high performance platform that matches
the end-user’s preferences and sacrificing some of those preferences in exchange
for improved or less costly third party development capabilities. In particular,
high performance is a competitive advantage in attracting the end-users how-
ever an aggressive investment in platform technology may make it more costly
to develop content for the platform. This bears the risk of insufficient content
development by third party developers, which in turn reduces end-users’ will-
ingness to pay for the platform. In this essay, we use a strategic model to gain
intuition about how to make such trade-off decisions under competition.
Specifically, we study performance investment decisions of two compet-
ing platforms. We assume that higher performance makes third party content
development more costly, either directly as in the case of video game platforms
or indirectly by taking away resources that could have been used on improving
third party development capabilities. We consider two different games based
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on the order of market entry: a simultaneous-move game where platforms en-
ter the market at the same time and a sequential-move game where there is a
leader and a follower in the market. Our results suggest that contrary to the
conventional wisdom about “winner-take-all” markets, heavily investing in the
core performance of a platform does not always yield a competitive edge when
there are strong cross-network effects. In particular, offering a platform with
lower performance but greater availability of content may be a better strategy.
In the third essay, we study dual-sourcing from unreliable suppliers
with different delivery characteristics. Many firms resort to multiple-sourcing
for various reasons. First of all, maintaining a diverse portfolio of suppliers
allows for risk sharing. Due to the increasing complexity of supply chains,
modern firms are much more vulnerable to disruptions in supply. The reces-
sion has exacerbated these concerns by increasing the capacity risk as suppliers
take capacity offline by shuttering facilities, cutting shifts, and curtailing new
production until the market returns. Consequently, supply diversification has
become a common strategy to hedge against these possible shortfalls of sup-
ply. Second, multiple sourcing may provide leadtime flexibility. In other words,
firms may make the best cost–responsiveness balance by keeping a cheap off-
shore supplier and an expensive onshore supplier. To fully take advantage of
these benefits of multiple sourcing, it is critical to take into account the key
dimensions of supply characteristics, mainly cost, reliability and leadtime. In
this essay, we attempt to understand the joint effect of these dimensions on a
firm’s multiple-sourcing strategy.
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In particular, we consider a firm that has two procurement sources,
a fast supplier of one-period delivery leadtime and a slow supplier of two-
period delivery leadtime. The capacity of each supplier is uncertain upon
ordering which introduces a supply risk. We use dynamic programming to
explore the optimal procurement policy for different levels of net inventory,
cost parameters, and supplier reliability. We analyze how the firm allocates
its total order between the two suppliers to mitigate supply and demand risks
while facing trade-offs between leadtime, reliability and procurement cost. We
shed light on the unique risk mitigation benefits associated with the slow
supplier. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating cost, leadtime
and reliability in a unified framework to evaluate supplier selection strategies.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the existing operations man-
agement literature in two ways. First, it illustrates the role of effective risk
mitigation through integrating leadtime flexibility and supply diversification
as well as through recognizing managerial flexibility. Second, it highlights the
importance of leveraging third-party content development while making tech-
nology investment decisions for platforms in two-sided markets. In Chapter 5,
we present a summary of our results and discuss directions for future research.
5
Chapter 2
Evaluating System Dynamics Models of Risky
Projects Using Decision Trees and Real
Options Theory
2.1 Introduction
System dynamics (SD), beginning with the work of Forrester (1961),
has been used to support project management for decades (Abdel-Hamid and
Madnick 1991, Abdel-Hamid 1984, Pugh 1984, Roberts 1974, Lyneis and Ford
2007). Yet, the number of studies that use SD models to capture the value
of managerial flexibility within risky projects remains small (Lyneis and Ford
2007). The real options valuation approach is the state-of-the-art method to
value capital investment projects. It applies financial options theory to value
options derived from managerial flexibility, which are called “real options”
to reflect their association with real assets rather than with financial assets
(Myers 1987, Trigeorgis and Mason 1987, Trigeorgis 1991, Dixit and Pindyck
2001). Accounting for the value of managerial flexibility such as the right,
but not the obligation, to expand, postpone, or terminate a project during its
implementation is essential to provide a good estimate of the value of risky
projects. Hence, integrating SD models of projects into the existing real-
options valuation methods may offer many potential benefits.
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The main benefit of using SD models for the valuation of risky projects
is the increased realism of the project model itself. Traditional methods to
value managerial flexibility model project uncertainty by assuming an analyt-
ically tractable stochastic process (e.g. McDonald and Siegel 1986, Paddock,
Siegel and Smith 1988, Pindyck 1991, Capozza and Li 1994, Trigeorgis 1991,
Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994). Yet, these simple stochastic processes may not
capture the complex real-world behavior of uncertainties that result from non-
linear feedback structures, such as rework and learning curves. Modeling the
structure that produces this complex behavior with SD methodology may im-
prove the accuracy of the ultimate valuation. Another advantage of using SD
methodology is its flexibility in defining complex feedback systems and sepa-
rate stochastic effects, which is quite beneficial in dealing with multiple and
potentially interacting sources of uncertainty. In addition, describing the dis-
tribution of uncertainty around SD variables is intuitive thanks to the method-
ology’s emphasis upon the use of concrete variables that correspond to “real”
phenomena (Sterman 2000). As a result, SD provides clearer insights into the
drivers of the effect of a strategic action (Johnson, Taylor and Ford 2006).
There is a burgeoning literature that recognizes these benefits. Ford and
Sobek (2005) build a product development project model that uses real options
concepts to manage product design risk. Ford and Bhargav (2006) examine
the relationship between project management quality and the value of flexible
strategies. Johnson et al. (2006) use an SD model to value flexibility in a
large petrochemical project. These papers provide examples of how managerial
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flexibility can be incorporated into SD models of projects by analyzing projects
with a single option. They do not focus, however, on formalizing an algorithm
to estimate the value of projects in which managerial flexibility is characterized
by complex option structures.
The difficulty in evaluating complex option structures within SD models
lies in the necessity to optimize a sequential decision process, which typically
involves backwards induction (Bertsekas 2005), a technique incompatible with
most SD simulation evaluation algorithms. In contrast to system dynamics,
decision tree analysis provides an intuitive approach commonly used to model
sequential decision processes (Clemen 1997) and is compatible with backwards
induction. The decision tree models are also appealing because they are easy
to explain to non-practitioners.
To take advantage of the complementary strengths of system dynamics
and decision analysis in representing stochastic models and decision processes
respectively, we propose two decision-tree based algorithms, SD-based decision
tree approach and the diffusion approximation approach, to evaluate SD mod-
els of projects that involve managerial flexibility. The algorithms we propose
are based upon first formulating a system dynamics model of the project and
then transforming the cash flow data obtained from the model into a deci-
sion tree. By leveraging the decision analysis literature (Clemen 1997), the
algorithms enable a backwards induction (Bertsekas 2005) solution approach
to evaluate the project. This approach is inherently attractive because Nau
and McCardle (1991) and Smith and Nau (Smith and Nau 1995) demonstrate
8
that decision tree analysis can duplicate real options based valuations under
certain conditions.
The SD-based decision tree algorithm’s transformation is similar to the
method described in Osgood and Kaufman (2003) and Osgood (2005)-which is
to the best of our knowledge, the only explicit use of multiple-decision decision
trees in the SD literature-with the important distinction that the proposed
new algorithm incorporates chance events dictated by endogenous dynamic
processes as opposed to exogenous scenarios generated by strictly exogenous
processes (the distinction will be clarified in Section 2.3). This enables the
SD-based decision tree algorithm to handle multiple endogenous sources of
uncertainty efficiently with less vulnerability to “the curse of dimensionality”.
The resulting decision tree is then evaluated using a risk-adjusted discount
rate for the project, which in practice is often the company’s weighted average
cost of capital (WACC).
One caveat with the SD-based decision tree approach is that the opti-
mization that occurs at the decision nodes changes the expected future cash
flows and thereby alters the risk characteristics of the project so that the risk-
adjusted discount rate for the project without options may not be appropriate
after the real options have been included in the model. To remedy that, the
second algorithm we propose, the diffusion approximation approach, modifies
the SD-based decision tree approach by using concepts from Copeland and
Antikarov (2001) and Brandao et al. (2005). The diffusion approximation ap-
proach avoids the problem of selecting an appropriate risk-adjusted discount
9
rate for the analysis by using a “risk neutral” valuation that provides a more
accurate estimate of the market value of the project.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 provides a mo-
tivating example for this paper, an alternative energy windmill project, and
describes an SD model for that project. This SD model includes many fea-
tures that would be prohibitive to represent in real options solution approaches
based on closed-form stochastic calculus or on spreadsheet models. Section 2.3
presents the SD-based decision tree algorithm by illustrating the transforma-
tion of SD simulation data into a decision tree that incorporates the project’s
“real options”. Section 2.4 introduces the diffusion approximation algorithm.
Section 2.5 illustrates the steps of valuing the example project using the diffu-
sion approximation algorithm. A comparison of the two valuation approaches
as well as a discussion of some limitations is provided in Section 2.6, followed
by a short conclusion in Section 2.7.
2.2 A Motivating Project and its System Dynamics Model
Concern about the high price and the environmental impacts of fossil
fuel use has increased support for alternative energy technologies (AETs) such
as wind power. However, developing these technologies has proven problem-
atic, in part because of the difficulty in estimating the return from investing in
such projects. AETs compete in the electricity generation market, the price dy-
namics of which have a correlation of 0.85 with natural gas prices (EIA 2007),
and in which the dominant, conventional technology is the combined-cycle
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natural gas plant. Hence, the price of natural gas is a major determinant of
how competitive AETs will be. Yet, natural gas prices are uncertain and cyclic
and are influenced by geopolitical and macroeconomic short-term factors.
The cost of developing a new technology is also uncertain. The bulk of
most AETs’ cost structures lies in their non-recurring costs. As for many other
new technologies (Argote 1999), these costs are typically reduced significantly
with each doubling of the cumulative capacity installed. However, the steep-
ness of this “learning curve” and its final “plateau” are generally unknown
ex ante. For example, estimates for wind power learning curves vary from
12% to 23% cost reduction per doubling of the cumulative capacity installed
(Junginger, Faaij and Turkenberg 2005, Musial and Butterfield 2004).
We will use a hypothetical wind power project to illustrate an SD-based
valuation method that handles multiple uncertainties in a reliable and realis-
tic manner. The SD methodology has been used to develop models that can
plausibly track both fossil fuel prices (Morecroft and van der Heijden 1992,
Naill 1992, Davidsen, Sterman and Richardson 1990, Sterman and Richardson
1985, Sterman 1981, Ford 1997) and technology “learning curves” (Anderson
and Parker 2002) as well as other forms of project risk embedded within en-
dogenous nonlinear feedback loops. The complex interactions among these
uncertainties are not captured easily with stylized models (Forrester 1975). In
principle, the model for this project, like any other system dynamics model,
might also be evaluated by a spreadsheet. However, the number of interdepen-
dent dynamic equations involved may make this impractical for any non-trivial
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model. Furthermore, such a spreadsheet model would conceal the structure
and therefore be potentially error-prone.
The illustrative example in this paper is based on a hypothetical firm’s
effort to evaluate an investment opportunity to build a 40-MW wind farm with
the option to add 50 MW within the first 4 years. The firm can also delay
the beginning of the project by up to 2 years. The expansion option may be
considered after the 40-MW wind farm comes online, which takes a year. The
option can be distributed over the remaining 2 years, but due to economies of
scale, the firm does not want to have less than 25 MW built at a time. So, the
firm can either expand high (build all 50 MW at once) or expand low (build 25
MW one year) with the option to build another 25 MW in the successive year
or suspend investment, i.e. continue operating the wind farm at its current
capacity. The details of the project specifications are provided in Table 2.11.
Project Specifications
Capital Costs ($/kW) $1,015
Fixed Operation and Maintenance Costs ($/kW/yr) $20
Variable Operation and Maintenance Costs ($/MWh) $1
Capacity Factor (%) 30%
Shaping and Integration Costs ($/MWh) $7
Project life 20 years
Table 2.1: Project Specifications
This example is kept simple for the sake of clarity in exposition, but it
1Cost figures are adapted from Northwest Power and Conservation Council (2007)
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contains sufficient embedded stochastic processes that make system dynamics
models attractive. The proposed algorithm can handle this as well as much
more complex models (albeit within certain limitations discussed in Section
2.6).
Figure 2.1 is a sector diagram of a generic SD model for evaluating a
wind-power AET project2. Implicitly, there is a two-tier supply-chain structure
in the model: The supplier, who installs the equipment for the energy plant
(e.g. windmills), and the generating firm, who evaluates the investment op-
portunity. As the firm acquires more capacity, the supplier “learns-by-doing”
which leads to increased productivity and lower installation costs. Hence, the
more the generating firm invests, the lower the costs it will face in its future
investments. Similar feedback relations in this context have been modeled in
Ford (2006) and Vogstad (2004). The supplier also takes some advantage of
global technological improvements, which is approximated as the impact of a
“global” capacity acquisition level.
The model is built for a medium scale firm, which is a price-taker. As
described earlier, electricity price dynamics are correlated with the dynamics
of natural gas price. The gas price sector is based on the feedback loops
described in Sterman et al (1988). State and federal regulations also play a
key role in determining the profitability of an AET investment project. For
example, renewable energy producers currently receive a 1.9 cent benefit per
2A description of the model can be found in Appendix A
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Figure 2.1: Sector Diagram of the SD Model
kilowatt-hour of generation, known as the production tax credit (PTC). The
uncertain expiration date of the PTC has been a major consideration in wind
capacity investment decisions.
Three major uncertainties are captured by the model: natural gas price,
the learning curve and the expiration date of the production tax credit (see Ta-
ble 2.2). Natural gas price uncertainty has several components. The demand
growth ratio is the rate that “base demand” for natural gas is assumed to grow.
The base demand is assumed to grow continuously. It is primarily a function of
population growth less any potential reduction in energy usage intensity. Ini-
tial undiscovered resources of natural gas is another major uncertain variable
that determines the gas supply and hence the future gas prices. In addition to
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these factors, the natural gas supply is exposed to random disruptions whose
frequency, size and duration are uncertain.
Uncertain Parameters
Gas Price Model Parameters Units
Demand Growth Ratio 1/Month
Initial Undiscovered Resources tcf
Supply Disruption Size 1/Month
Supply Disruption Frequency Dimensionless
Average Length of Supply Disruptions Month
Learning Curve Parameters Units
Steepness of the Learning Curve Dimensionless
Weight of Global Learning Dimensionless
Official Expiration Date of PTC Month
Table 2.2: Uncertainties Captured in the Model
The learning curve uncertainty has two components: The steepness of
the learning curve determines how fast the cost of capacity drops with doubling
of the cumulative capacity installed. The weight of global learning determines
how much the supplier benefits from the technological improvements (global
capacity acquisitions) elsewhere. Other uncertainties (e.g. wind speed, the
minimum possible capacity cost, etc.) could easily be incorporated without
increasing the complexity of the solution procedure.
2.3 SD-based Decision Tree Approach
In this section, we describe the SD-based decision tree approach. The
first step of the algorithm is identifying the “real options” in the project.
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At each period, the manager needs to decide whether or not to exercise the
available options; hence there is a sequence of decisions to be made throughout
the horizon of the project. Each possible sequence of these decisions is called
a decision sequence. In the example problem, the firm has several managerial
options that are valid at different time periods: invest (I), delay (D), expand
high (H), expand low (L) and suspend further investment (S). The time period
is set at one year, so t = 1 represents the end of the first project year. Hence,
these options result in the 10 decision sequences that can be seen in Table 2.4.
Steps of the Algorithm
Step 1 Identify the managerial decision sequence
Step 2 Build the deterministic SD model that captures the
project dynamics
Step 3 Model the uncertainty by specifying the random
variables and their distribution
Step 4 Run Monte Carlo simulations of the SD model for
each decision sequence
Step 5 Obtain the discrete distribution approximations
for the first period cash flow distribution for each
decision sequence
Step 6 Obtain the conditional discrete approximations for
the remaining periods for each decision sequence
Step 7 Solve the decision tree by backwards induction us-
ing the risk adjusted discount rate
Table 2.3: Steps of the SD-based decision tree algorithm
The second step is building the deterministic SD model that captures
the project dynamics. In the example problem, the model must capture the
AET capacity investment, fossil fuel prices, and learning curve dynamics.
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Then, as Step 3, the underlying uncertainty of the project has to be mod-
eled by specifying the random processes and their distributions. In this case,












1 I N/A S S
2 I N/A S L
3 I N/A S H
4 I N/A H S
5 I N/A L S
6 I N/A L L
7 D I N/A L
8 D I N/A H
9 D I N/A S
10 D D I N/A
Table 2.4: Decision Sequences for the Example Problem
Next, the valuation problem is translated into a decision tree. Basic
components of a decision tree are as follows: Square nodes are the decision
nodes, which represent the decisions to be made at a particular time, like
“invest high or suspend”. Branches leaving a decision node represent the
decision alternatives. Circular nodes are the chance nodes, which represent the
uncertainties underlying the project. Branches leaving a chance node represent
possible outcomes of an uncertain event, and we use the SD-based decision tree
approach that requires any continuous uncertainty to be approximated by a
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discrete probability distribution3. Triangular nodes are the terminal nodes
that depict the final outcome of a particular scenario after all decisions have
been made, all uncertainty has been resolved and all payoffs are received.
The fourth step of the algorithm is running Monte Carlo simulations
for each decision sequence in Table 2.4 (It is straightforward to impose these
decision sequences in the SD model with a few additional if-then-else type
equations). A Monte Carlo run for a specific decision sequence gives a cash flow
distribution for each period. In the example problem, the time horizon is 20
periods; hence, we obtain 20 cash flow distributions for each decision sequence
in Table 2.4, making a total of 200 distributions. For example, the distribution
displayed in Figure 2.2 is the distribution of the 7th period cash flows obtained
under the decision sequence “invest-suspend-suspend” after 1000 iterations of
the simulation model.
In traditional decision analysis models, uncertainty is modeled by as-
signing probabilities to each branch leaving a chance node. These exogenously
assigned probabilities may represent subjective beliefs about the likelihood of
a specific “event” represented by the chance node (e.g. the probability of PTC
being suspended) or they may be risk-neutral-probability measures4 of price
3Modern decision tree software does allow a chance node to be represented by a con-
tinuous probability distribution, and can use Monte Carlo simulation to obtain a solution
for this case. However, this approach becomes computationally challenging for complex
decision trees with multiple chance nodes, and it also requires the calculation of the ending
node outcome for each iteration of the simulation. Since we use an SD model to calculate
the ending node outcome, this could require running the SD model thousands of times.
4Risk-neutral measure is an important concept in the context of mathematical finance
and risk neutral valuation is an important general principle in option pricing (Hull 2006).
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Figure 2.2: The Distribution of the 7th Period Cash Flows under the “I-S-S”
Decision Sequence
uncertainties derived from market data. However, in our approach exogenous
scenarios such as PTC suspension are incorporated at the stage of building the
stochastic SD model. Hence, instead of building a decision tree that explicitly
models every source of uncertainty as separate chance nodes, we take a dif-
ferent approach. In our method, a chance node represents the distribution of
the random cash flow accumulated during a given period t, which is obtained
from the Monte Carlo simulation of the SD model for the corresponding deci-
sion sequence. These cash flow distributions are the outcome of the random
A risk-neutral measure is a probability measure in which today’s arbitrage-free price of a
derivative security is equal to the discounted expected value (under the measure) of the
future payoff of the derivative. The measure is in general different than the “physical”
measure of probability and is employed to determine the worth of derivative securities.
Please refer to Dixit and Pyndick (2001) for further details.
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processes that are shaped in the SD model.
This representation of chance nodes has two advantages. First, it allows
multiple uncertainties in a time period to be represented by a single uncertain
variable (the cash flow in that time period) without changing the size of the
tree and without adding any computational burden. The only cost of adding
more uncertainties is the increased run time for the Monte Carlo simulations.
Second, the approach simplifies handling valuation problems that involve path-
dependent stochastic processes, such as the investment cost at period t which
is a function of the cumulative capacity investment up to t. Such processes are
represented effectively within an SD model. Since the cash flow distributions
are obtained through SD simulations, the proposed approach is powerful in
handling complex, path-dependent stochastic feedback structures.
The cash flow distributions obtained from the Monte Carlo runs are
continuous. In order to place them into the tree as chance nodes, one needs
to transform them into discrete distribution approximations without losing
too much precision. We use the bracket median approximation technique
(Clemen 1997) to obtain a k-point discrete distribution approximation: First,
the distribution is divided into k equally likely intervals. Then the median
of each interval is determined. Hence, the continuous distribution is approxi-
mated with k median values that are each equally likely to occur (with prob-
ability 1/k). The choice of k is a critical one. If too few intervals are chosen,
the conformity of the discrete cash flow distribution to the continuous distri-
bution will be low, which may lead to the recommendation of an alternative
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that would not be optimal for the true cash flows. If too many are chosen, the
computations involved will become prohibitive. The issue of the appropriate
level of detail in a model is common to all applications, and the practitioner
needs to resolve this trade-off on a case-by-case basis. As an example, when a
project has a relatively short horizon or when managerial flexibility is limited
to a certain phase of the project rather than being spread out in the entire
horizon (such as an option to delay), dimensionality is less of a problem, and it
is feasible to use a bigger k. Yet, if the analysis does not demand high fidelity
to the tails of the distribution, a bigger k may not be necessary.
The fifth step of the algorithm is obtaining k-point discrete distribution
approximations for the first period cash flow distributions of each decision
sequence by using the bracket median method. In the example problem, three-
point discrete approximations are used. Depending on the firm’s decisions
and on how the natural gas price, capacity cost and tax credit uncertainties
evolve, the cash flow at the end of each period may be termed high, medium
or low (each of these could possibly be less than zero). Note that the cash
flow distributions for period t are conditional on the cash flow distributions of
period t− 1, as well as on what decision sequence is chosen. For example, the
high level at period t given that the cash flow was low in period t − 1 is, in
general, different from the high level given that the cash flow in period t − 1
was high.
In Step 6, the discrete conditional probability distributions are com-
puted using the following procedure:
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of the Conditional Distribution Computations for a
Given Decision Sequence
Step 6.a : Divide the initial table of cash flows into k tables designed for the
designated levels of the first period cash flows (i.e. high, medium, low).
Make sure to preserve the sample path structure: If a realization of C̃1
falls into the bracket high (as a result of Step 5), then carry that entire
sample path C̃1, C̃2, ..., C̃T over the table for high. As a result of this
step, k tables with N/k rows and T columns are obtained where N is
the size of the Monte Carlo simulation and T is the number of periods
(in this case, years) in the valuation problem.
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Step 6.b : Apply the bracket median approximation to each table obtained in
Step 6.a in order to discretize the second period cash flows. Then, fur-
ther divide each table obtained in Step 6.a into k tables with N/k2 rows
and T columns with respect to second period cash flows C̃2, obtaining k
2
tables (high-high, high-medium, low-high, etc). The process is illustrated
in Figure 2.3.
Step 6.c : Repeat this procedure until the last period. If there are no decision
nodes after a certain period t, one can apply the procedure to the present
value of cumulative cash flows after t instead of carrying the procedure
until the last period. This would result in losing the volatility informa-
tion after t but would not change the optimum decision sequence and
the expected net present value.
Note that these operations for obtaining the conditional probabilities
must be carried out for each decision sequence. Fortunately, this can be accom-
plished with the help of a simple Visual Basic macro. The decision problem
is represented with the decision tree shown in Figure 2.4 using the software
program DPL. Note that this representation of the tree is compact. If a single
chance or decision node follows multiple branches from a predecessor node (like
the highlighted nodes in Figure 2.4), it indicates that the chance or decision
node is actually appended at the end of each branch of the predecessor node.
For example, the highlighted decision node “OPTION T2” is represented to
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follow the “Medium” branch of “Cash Flow T1” but actually it is appended
at all the branches of “Cash Flow T1”. The paths that are not explicitly de-
picted in this compact representation are hidden for visual clarity but are not
excluded from the solution procedure.
Figure 2.4: Decision Tree Representation in DPL
The last step of the algorithm is solving the decision tree. After ob-
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taining the net present value (NPV) for all the terminal nodes of a decision
sequence for each decision sequence, we evaluate the decisions at the final pe-
riod T and then move backwards using backwards induction. In practice, this
step is handled easily by using decision analysis software such as DPL.
The example problem is solved using the DPL decision analysis software
with a discount rate equal to the WACC of the firm, which is assumed to be
10%. The optimal policy is highlighted in bold in Figure 5. The expected PV
is $55.386 million and the expected NPV of the project is $14.786 million. The
expected NPV of the project without options (which is the expected NPV of
the strategy “invest-suspend-suspend”) is $7.79 million; hence the combined
value of the options is approximately $7 million. The positive NPV suggests
that the project should be undertaken. If the cash flow in the first period is
low or high, the firm should expand low in two consecutive periods taking full
advantage of the learning curve effect. High cash flow corresponds to high
natural gas prices and continuing production tax credit. If the cash flow is
medium, expanding high is optimal; yet, expanding low in two consecutive
periods yields practically the same NPV ($12.81 vs. $12.77 million).
The value of a specific option associated with each decision node may
be determined simply by rebuilding the tree without that option and solving
that simplified tree. An estimation of the expected value of that option is the
difference between the value of the project with the option and without the
option. If the option has a cost, the firm should acquire the option if this
estimated value is higher than the cost of the option.
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Figure 2.5: The Optimum Policy for the Example Problem
2.4 The Diffusion Approximation Approach
One major limitation of the SD-based decision tree approach is that
the risk-adjusted discount rate for the project without options is used as the
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discount factor for the entire decision tree (Teisberg 1995). Essentially, the
risk-adjusted discount rate that a financial analyst should choose to value the
project with options may be different from the one he should choose to value
the project without options because of the alternatives’ different risk levels.
An analysis based on a single discount rate may be unreliable especially if the
valuation results are highly sensitive to the discount rate.
The classical approach to incorporating market information on risk is
based upon identifying a replicating portfolio for the project under considera-
tion and using the volatility information of this replicating portfolio to obtain
an appropriate discount rate for the project. However, the replicating portfolio
assumption is difficult to use in practice when evaluating individual corporate
investments because it is hard to find a single replicating asset or even a port-
folio of publicly traded assets with returns that are perfectly correlated with
those from the project (Borison 2005), and the appropriate replicating portfo-
lio may change if the risk of the project is changed by the addition of options.
This criticism can be overcome by using a decision-tree based real op-
tions valuation method developed by Copeland and Antikarov (2001) and
modified by Brandao, Dyer and Hahn (2005). The method is a decision tree
based approach that combines any number of uncertainties into one combined
stochastic process representing the project value and it avoids the need to
find a replicating portfolio. We will make some modifications to this method
and call it the diffusion approximation approach. Copeland and Antikarov
(Copeland and Antikarov 2001) and Brandao, Dyer and Hahn (2005) suggest
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the use of a Monte Carlo simulation of a pro forma spreadsheet model to ob-
tain an estimate of the risk associated with the project without options, which
is then used to construct the required decision tree. Instead we substitute sim-
ulation runs from an SD model and obtain a reliable, and theoretically correct
(from the point of view of the finance literature) valuation of the investment
projects.
In its simplest form, the diffusion approximation method assumes that
the changes in the project’s value over time approximately follows a geometric
Brownian motion (GBM) diffusion process, which is a standard assumption in
the finance literature (e.g. Copeland and Antikarov 2001). The method re-
lies on the market asset disclaimer (MAD) assumption5, which assumes that
the value of the project without options is the best unbiased estimator of the
market value of the project. Hence, the present value of the project with-
out options is taken as the market price of the project as if it were traded
(Copeland and Antikarov 2001). Then, the value of the project without op-
tions is assumed to change over time according to a GBM process, which is
the same process used to model the changes in the price of a stock when the
Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model is used. The assumptions be-
hind the GBM model may not hold for all projects, in which case other models
5The MAD assumption is used in order to create a complete market for an asset that is
not traded in the market. It is a strong modeling assumption made to justify the use of risk-
neutral valuation. Nevertheless, it eliminates the reliance on the existence of a replicating
portfolio. Instead, it uses the project itself as the twin security and is claimed to “make
assumptions no stronger than those used to estimate the project NPV in the first place”
(Copeland and Antikarov 2001, p. 67). For further discussion of the MAD assumption, see
also Borison (2005) and Smith (2005).
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of stochastic processes (e.g. mean reverting) may be used (Brandao, Dyer and
Hahn 2005, Hahn and Dyer 2008, Wang and Dyer 2009).
We use the GBM model because the use of a binomial lattice approx-
imation to a GBM process is well established in the literature (Hull 2006)
and it is straightforward to build a corresponding decision tree to value the
project once the parameters of the process are provided. In the decision tree
representation, the project values are discounted with the risk-free rate since
the risk-neutral probabilities are used, which eliminates the need to estimate
different risk-adjusted discount rates as options are added to the project.
The first three steps of the diffusion approximation approach are similar
to the SD-based decision tree approach: 1) Identify the decision variables 2)
Build the deterministic SD model 3) Specify the distributions of the uncertain
variables. The next three steps involve calculating the parameters of a GBM
approximation of the project uncertainty. The critical parameters required to
model this approximation are the present value (PV) of the project without
options, cash flow payout rate in each period t, δt, volatility of the project
returns, σ, and the risk free rate, r.
Step 4 of the diffusion approximation algorithm is calculating the ex-
pected PV of the project without options by using a DCF analysis. To do that,
we run Monte Carlo simulations of the project without options and obtain the
PV for each iteration (sample path) using a risk-adjusted discount rate µ ,
29
such as the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 6 of the firm. Then, the
average of these iterations is used as an estimate of the PV of the project.
Step 5 of the diffusion approximation approach is obtaining the cash
flow payout rate δt in each period. The cash flow payout rate is the ratio of
the cash flow in a given period t to the value of the project in that period. The
project value at time t is simply the present value of the remaining project
cash flows. Note that each iteration j of the Monte Carlo simulation gives a
sample path of cash flow obtained in each period t, denoted by Ct,j. Let Ṽt
and C̃t be random variables representing the remaining project value and the
cash flow in period t, and V̄t and C̄t be their corresponding means. For each
iteration j of the Monte Carlo simulation, the project value Vt,j in each time







where µ is the risk adjusted discount rate and T is the number of periods.





In the algorithm, the cash flow payout rates are used to calculate the cash flows
that are paid out at the end of each time period as a function of the project
value. In line with the previous work, we assume that the cash flows vary
over time reflecting the uncertainty in the project value, but that in each time
6See Brandao et al (2005) for a discussion on the choice of the discount rate for this step.
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period they are a constant fraction (δt) of the remaining value of the project
(Copeland and Antikarov 2001, Brandao and Dyer 2005, Brandao et al. 2005).
The sixth step of the algorithm is estimating the volatility (σ) of the
project returns. Smith (2005) suggests an approach to estimating this volatil-
ity that can be used in the SD simulation environment. First, we model the
GBM approximation of the project value setting V0 = PV and using:
dVt = (µV dt+ σV dz)(1− δt) (2.3)
where dz = ε
√
dt and ε ∼ N(0, 1). Once the change in the uncertain project
value is defined, we can easily model the random cash flow C̃t by using the
assumption C̃t = Ṽt ∗ δt. Then, we search for a volatility that best mimics
the uncertainty in the original SD model; i.e., that minimizes the difference
between the cash flow distributions generated by the original SD simulation
model and the cash flow distributions obtained by the GBM approximation.
One way of doing this is comparing the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the
cash flow distributions obtained through the GBM approximation for a given
volatility to the corresponding values given by the original SD model. Note
that this results in 3T pairs to be compared, where T is the number of periods.
Sum of squared errors between these pairs provides a measure of fit for the
GBM approximation under the given volatility. We repeat this procedure for
a predetermined set of candidate values for volatility. Then, we choose the
value that minimizes the sum of squared errors.
Once the volatility of the project returns is determined, we have all the
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parameters required to model the GBM that characterizes the project uncer-
tainty. However, in order to represent this continuous stochastic process on a
decision tree, a discrete approximation is needed. The binomial approxima-
tion to the GBM process serves this purpose by representing the GBM process
with a binomial lattice. A binomial lattice is a probability tree with binary
chance branches that go up (u) or down (d) with the unique feature that the
outcome resulting from moving up and then down is the same as the outcome
from moving down and then up (Figure 2.6). In particular, the binomial lat-
tice model assumes that with probability p the value of the project V will go
up to V u, and with probability 1− p it will go down to V d at the end of one
period. The parameter u is greater than 1 (reflecting a proportional increase),
whereas d (reflecting a proportional decrease).
Figure 2.6: A Binomial Lattice
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The next step of the algorithm involves calculating the parameters of
the binomial lattice. The initial value V of the project is approximated by the
PV of the project without options obtained in Step 4. In order to calculate the
remaining three parameters u, d and p, it is sufficient to know the volatility σ







1 + r∆t− d
u− d
where ∆t is the time period used in the binomial lattice. The probabilities
p and 1 − p are the probabilities that a risk-neutral investor would assign to
the two outcomes; therefore they are often called “risk-neutral” probabilities.
Assigning risk-neutral probabilities enables using the risk-free rate to discount
the cash flows; hence, we avoid estimating different risk-adjusted discount rates
as options are added to the project.
The lattice may also be “unfolded” and represented as an equivalent
binomial tree. This increases the number of endpoints in the model decreasing
computational efficiency, but allows these problems to be solved using “off the
shelf” decision tree software with a simple and intuitive visual representation.
In this algorithm, we choose using the decision tree approach instead of a bino-
mial lattice in order to take advantage of the aforementioned complementary
advantages of decision tree analysis and system dynamics.
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The eighth step of the algorithm is building the binomial tree represent-
ing the project without options, which requires calculating the project value
and the cash flow at each period and each state up (u) and down (d). First,
note that at each period a fraction δt of the project value is paid out as cash
flow diminishing the value of the project to Vt ∗ (1 − δt). Accordingly, the
project value in the subsequent period is calculated as follows:
V ut+1 = Vt(1− δt)u (2.5)
V dt+1 = Vt(1− δt)d (2.6)
where u and d are given by (2.4). The cash flow Ct,k = V
k
t ∗ δt at state k and
period t can be discounted at the risk free rate r since risk-neutral probabilities
are used. Hence, the discounted cash flow that is paid out at each time period





Once the project without options is modeled with a binomial decision
tree (Step 8), options can be added in the form of decision nodes. For example,
an abandon option can be modeled by adding a decision node without any
subsequent chance nodes (i.e. no further cash flows), whereas simple expansion
and contraction options can be modeled as percentage changes in the cash flows
(for details, see Brandao et al. 2005).
These eight steps are summarized in Table 2.5.
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Steps of the Algorithm
Step 1 Identify the managerial flexibilities
Step 2 Build the deterministic SD model that captures the
project dynamics
Step 3 Model the uncertainty by specifying the random
variables and their distributions
Step 4 Run Monte Carlo simulations of the SD model
for the project without options and calculate the
present value
Step 5 Obtain the cash flow payout rates for each period
Step 6 Estimate the volatility of the project returns
Step 7 Calculate the parameters of the binomial approxi-
mation to the GBM process (i.e. u, d and p)
Step 8 Build the binomial tree
Step 9 Add the options and solve the decision tree by us-
ing the risk free rate
Table 2.5: Steps of the Diffusion Approximation Algorithm
2.5 Illustration of the Diffusion Approximation Algo-
rithm
We will use the same hypothetical wind power project described in
Section 2.2 to illustrate the diffusion approximation algorithm. The first three
steps of the diffusion approximation algorithm are the same as explained in
Section 2.3. At Step 4, the expected PV of the project without options at time
t = 0 is calculated using a DCF analysis. To do that, we use the Monte Carlo
simulation of the strategy “invest-suspend-suspend”, which reflects the project
without options. Then, we calculate the PV of each simulation iteration using
the WACC and take the average of these iterations to obtain an estimate of the
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expected PV. In the example project, the expected PV of the project without
options is found to be $48.39 million. Then, as the next step, cash flow payout
rates are estimated for each time period using (2.1) and (2.2).
Period δt Period δt Period δt Period δt
1 0.027 6 0.136 11 0.183 16 0.246
2 0.107 7 0.148 12 0.162 17 0.302
3 0.128 8 0.152 13 0.18 18 0.369
4 0.132 9 0.157 14 0.195 19 0.53
5 0.139 10 0.169 15 0.218 20 1
Table 2.6: Cash Flow Payout Rates
The PV and the cash flow payout rates are used to estimate the volatil-
ity of the GBM approximation. First, using this PV and the cash flow payout
rates, and assigning an arbitrary value for volatility, a GBM approximation is
modeled. Then, we search for the volatility that best mimics the uncertainty
in the original SD model as described in Section 2.4. We use the risk analysis
software @Risk in simulating the GBM process and estimating the cash flow
percentiles. We find that when σ = 0.06, the GBM approximation mimics the
cash flow distributions given by the original SD model quite closely (Figure
2.7). In this case, we limited the search to a predetermined set of candidate
values for volatility; however, when more precision is required one can solve
a stochastic optimization problem to determine the volatility that minimizes
the difference between the original and the approximated cash flows.
As the next step (Step 7), we calculate the parameters of the binomial
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Figure 2.7: GBM Approximation vs. the Original Model Cash Flows
approximation of this GBM diffusion process. We set ∆t = 1 year and as-
suming a 5% risk free rate, obtain u = 1.06, d = 0.94 and p = 0.901. Finally,
the initial value V of the project is approximated by the PV of the project
without options, $48.39 million. Figure 2.8 depicts the first four periods of the
binomial tree.
The last step is adding the options to the decision tree by using deci-
sion nodes (for details, see Brandao et al. 2005). For the example project, the
cash flows change proportionally with the changes in the capacity. For exam-
ple, the option to expand by 25 MW (“Expand Low”) increases the capacity
by 62.5%. The revenues from electricity generation are proportional to the
capacity; hence, the increase in revenue when the option is exercised can be
modeled by simply increasing the cash flows by 62.5%. Yet, this scheme does
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Figure 2.8: Binomial Tree Model of Value of Project without Options
not directly allow for incorporating the uncertainty in the cost of capacity (the
learning curve uncertainty) because the cost of capacity is a one time payment
at the exercise time of the option, which does not affect the cash flow stream
afterwards. To handle this issue, we modeled the learning curve uncertainty
as a private risk.
In many projects, there are project-specific risks that cannot be hedged
by trading securities, such as technological risks. In view of that, real options
studies make the distinction between public (market-priced) risks and private
(project-specific) risks (Smith and Nau 1995). When the investment under
concern is dominated by private risks, dynamic programming based approaches
(such as decision tree analysis) should be preferred rather than the traditional
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option pricing techniques that were developed mainly for market-priced risks
(Dixit and Pindyck 2001). Many projects have both kinds of risks, though; in
which case the recommended strategy is to separate the public and private risks
and use the appropriate risk adjustment for each one (Borison 2005, Brandao
et al. 2005, Smith and Nau 1995).
Fortunately, treating different types of risks separately is straightfor-
ward once a decision tree is created. Public and private risks may be repre-
sented with separate chance nodes. Risk-neutral probabilities are used for the
former and subjective probabilities are used for the latter. For the example
project, the cost of capacity is discretized so that at any period t, it is high,
nominal or low. The values for each of these branches were obtained by dis-
cretizing the Monte Carlo simulation data for the cost of capacity. This is done
the same way as the cash flow distributions are discretized in the SD-based
decision tree algorithm: A three-point bracket median method is used while
preserving the path-dependence of the learning curve uncertainty by carefully
computing the conditional probabilities of the branches. For example, chance
nodes HighC, NominalC and LowC in Figure 2.9 discretize the learning curve
uncertainty for the first period. Note that the uncertainty in the cost of ca-
pacity does not affect the volatility of the subsequent cash flows.
The decision tree was built and solved using DPL (Figure 2.9). The
expected PV of the project is estimated to be $57.48 million. The optimal
policy suggests that the investment should be undertaken and it is optimal to
expand high afterwards. Note that the SD-based decision tree approach results
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Figure 2.9: The Optimal Policy
in an expected PV of $55.386 million and suggests investing immediately and
expanding afterwards, the amount depending on the cash flow realization.
2.6 Discussion
Smith (1999) makes the observation that when evaluating risky projects,
there has existed a fundamental trade-off between what he terms “detail com-
plexity” and “dynamic complexity”. He suggests that financial theory has
tended to sacrifice detail complexity, the fidelity of a model at a detailed level,
to better capture market information to appropriately discount risky cash
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flows. On the other hand, he suggests that decision analysis has often focused
on detail complexity at the expense of keeping some model dynamics unreal-
istically simple, for example by using a single risk-adjusted discount rate to
value future cash flows even if the risks of these cash flows change when dif-
ferent project options are selected. In this paper, we have attempted to show
that by using a system dynamics model as an input to evaluating managerial
flexibility it is possible to improve this trade-off between dynamic and detail
complexity.
In particular, the diffusion approximation approach relies on building
an SD model of the project to model the project uncertainty and a binomial
tree approximation of the uncertainty to employ risk neutral valuation. The
former brings high fidelity to model details due to the unique capabilities of
SD in modeling complex feedback systems, whereas the latter avoids the need
to estimate a risk-adjusted discount rate for the project with options ensuring
better fidelity to dynamic complexity compared to traditional decision tree
methods. Hence, the algorithm potentially improves the trade-off between
dynamic and detail complexity especially for evaluating projects whose viabil-
ity is determined by the interaction of stochastic processes within a complex
nonlinear feedback structure.
For the example project, the SD-based decision tree approach and the
diffusion approximation approach yielded similar results. However, this will
not always be the case. The diffusion approximation algorithm overcomes
the major flaw of the SD-based decision tree approach, which is the use of
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the same risk-adjusted discount rate for the project with and without options
regardless of the changing risk character. In general, for projects with long
lives or for projects whose risk-profiles change significantly, the errors caused
by using the wrong discount rate are magnified, and the differences between
the two approaches become larger (Smith and McCardle 1998, Teisberg 1995).
Nonetheless, diffusion approximation approach has some limitations of
its own. The algorithm makes two strong assumptions. One is that the cash
flow of the project without options can be represented by a GBM (or other
similarly tractable) stochastic process. This implies that the algorithm will
only yield a reasonably accurate valuation if each period’s cash flow from the
project without options has an approximately lognormal distribution. Fortu-
nately, because of the numerous influences upon the individual cash flows that
one can represent in a system dynamics model, this is often the case.
A second restriction is that the diffusion approximation approach as-
sumes the cash flows of the project with an option are proportionate to the
cash flows of the project without the options. For example, if the firm exer-
cises an expansion option to increase its capacity by x%, the revenues should
change by a linear function of x. If this is not the case, then the diffusion
approximation approach may not be an appropriate modeling approach. In
such cases, the SD-based decision tree approach might be a better alternative
since it provides a greater fidelity to the details of the modeled project and is
not subject to the assumptions associated with the use of the GBM diffusion
approximation. Yet, for a reliable valuation the analyst needs to make sure
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that the valuation results are not highly sensitive to the choice of discount rate.
If project options do not create a significant change in the risk-profiles of their
associated cash flows, the SD-based decision tree approach should provide an
accurate estimate of the project value.
2.7 Summary and Conclusion
The viability of many projects is determined by a number of stochastic
dynamic processes interacting within a complex, nonlinear feedback structure.
For example, the value of alternative energy technology projects is largely de-
termined by fossil fuel prices and capital equipment costs, both of which are
highly stochastic and tied to complex feedback structures. System dynamics
is a methodology developed to analyze and manage complex feedback systems.
Consequently, it is powerful in handling nonlinearity and path-dependence un-
like the traditional methods used in representing stochastic dynamic processes.
The major contribution of this paper is in demonstrating how to eval-
uate projects with uncertainties embedded in feedback loops by using a real
options valuation approach and stochastic system dynamics models. We pro-
pose two methods, which we termed the SD-based decision tree approach and
the diffusion approximation approach, the former being based on traditional
decision tree analysis and the latter being based on modern finance theory.
Both methods transform data obtained from Monte Carlo simulations of an
SD model into an approximate decision tree, taking advantage of the comple-
mentary strengths of system dynamics and decision trees.
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Chapter 3
Platform Performance Investment in the
Presence of Network Externalities
3.1 Introduction
Video-game industry is one of the fastest growing industries in the
entertainment sector. It has already overtaken Hollywood box office and is ex-
pected to overtake music industry in North America and UK (EMA 2008, Fos-
ter and Ahmad 2008, Cheng 2007, Money 2007). This almost recession-proof
growth trend is partly made possible by the 7th generation game consoles’ suc-
cess in unlocking the market’s potential. The success story of Nintendo Wii
is particularly interesting and has provided the motivation behind this study.
Nintendo Wii is released later than the other 7th generation game consoles,
Sony’s PS3 and Microsoft’s Xbox, which may imply a significant disadvantage
in markets that exhibit network effects (Arthur 1989, Katz and Shapiro 1994).
Furthermore, the processing and graphical capabilities of Wii fall short of the
bar set by PS3 and Xbox (Allen 2006). Nonetheless, Wii has the biggest
installed base among the three (VG Chartz Home Page 2009).
Wii’s story stirred a lot of discussion advocating different reasons to
account for this success. One popular explanation has been Wii’s lower price,
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Figure 3.1: 7th generation video-game consoles cumulative sales. Taken from
vgchartz.com
which definitely gives it an edge against PS3. Yet, Wii’s price advantage over
Xbox is not as significant. Given the early entry advantage of Xbox, pric-
ing alone is unlikely to explain Wii’s success. Another success factor is Wii’s
unique motion-sensitive remote control, Wii Remote. Wii Remote creates a
unique gaming experience that is more welcoming to novice gamers because
of its intuitiveness. Yet, most of the games developed for Wii still use the tra-
ditional joystick controls instead of the unique remote, thus the remote alone
fails to fully account for Wii’s story. It has also been speculated that Nintendo
starved the market deliberately before the holiday seasons which created a
buzz and increased the desirability of owning a Wii (McIntyre 2008, Kane and
Wingfield 2007). Similar claims have also been made for earlier generation
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video-game consoles and the potential benefits of a deliberate shortage have
been well discussed (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). However, even if Wii
benefited from a deliberate shortage, Xbox 360 had a similar “strategy” as
well (Wingfield and Guth 2005). Hence, a shortage induced fad does not quite
explain how the Wii could overtake Xbox 360.
One particular reason behind Wii’s success provided the motivation for
this paper. Due to its lower processing and graphical capabilities that are
not much different than 6th generation technology, it is significantly cheaper
to develop games for Wii (Leheng 2006, Sinclair 2006), making the platform
attractive for game developers. Indeed, in spite of its late release, the Wii has
more game titles compared to its competitors (VG Chartz Game Database
2009). Many gamers seek a variety of games to play; hence the availability of
a variety of game titles makes a game console more attractive for the gamers.1
Likewise, a bigger installed base attracts game developers in the anticipation
of higher sales. These cross-network effects largely determine the fate of a
game console and they have worked out quite favorably for the Wii 2.
Wii’s story revealed that even though a game console with a higher
performance such as one with better graphical capabilities is attractive to
1Importance of software is well recognized in the industry. In an interview, Reggie Fils-
Aime, Nintendo’s current U.S. president states that Nintendo is putting a lot of effort in
encouraging publishers to make games for the Wii to ensure a steady flow of diverse games
saying “ Price cuts are a short-term incentive. In the long run, you need software to excite
people. In order to achieve high levels of sales of hardware, we need all genres in the market”
(Kane and Wakabayashi 2009).
2Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) provide an excellent account of how Nintendo cre-
ated a similar “virtuous circle” with its Nintendo Entertainment System in late 1980s.
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gamers, the technology behind high performance may make it more costly to
develop games and hinder game development. Furthermore, gamers’ interest
in further improved graphics might be much less than what is assumed by the
console manufacturers (Sheffield 2008). In other words, console manufacturers
might be overinvesting in the core performance of their platform. Indeed, Van
der Rhee et al. (2009) discuss that steepening the performance treadmill is not
always the best strategy in a competitive market. But how should a console
manufacturer balance the gamers’ preferences with game developers’ needs to
fully benefit from cross-network externalities?
A similar question can be posed for other two-sided markets. Two-
sided markets are markets in which one or several platforms facilitate inter-
actions between two distinct group of users whose interactions are subject
to cross-network effects (Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne 2006, Rochet and
Tirole 2006). Examples can be found in various industries such as cell phones,
credit cards, online dating services, travel reservation services, and shopping
malls. In many cases platform sponsors face a trade-off between developing a
high performance platform that matches the end-user’s preferences and sac-
rificing some of those preferences in exchange for improved or less costly 3rd
party development capabilities.
In this paper, we study the performance3 choice of two competing plat-
3We use the term “performance” to represent a vertically differentiated dimension of
quality (Mussa and Rosen 1978). For video-game consoles, better graphics and better
processing capabilities imply higher performance.
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form sponsors where higher performance makes third party content develop-
ment more costly, either directly as in the case of video game platforms or
indirectly by taking away resources that could have been used on improving
third party development capabilities. We consider two different games based
on the order of market entry: a simultaneous-move game where platforms
enter the market at the same time and a sequential-move game where there
is a leader and a follower in the market. We provide insights on the opti-
mum investment in platform performance and show that conventional wisdom
of product development may be misleading in the presence of strong cross-
network externalities.
In particular, we characterize when a platform market is content-driven
versus when it is performance-driven and discuss how conventional wisdom
could mislead a platform sponsor especially in content-driven markets. For in-
stance, in a one-sided market if competition between two platforms intensifies,
one would expect that at equilibrium there will be more investment to increase
the performance of the product. However, we show that platform sponsors
may be better off decreasing the investment in platform performance to pro-
vide greater content availability instead. Likewise, an increase in end-users’
interest in platform performance may still trigger a less aggressive investment
in platform performance if the market is content-driven. More importantly,
we show that when platforms are price-takers, a platform with a lower perfor-
mance can capture a bigger market share on both sides of the market, similar
to the success of the Wii. In other words, making the highest investment in
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technology is not the only way to be the winning platform. In certain markets,
the key to success is in better mobilization of third party developers.
We also observe that when platforms are able to determine the end-
user price in addition to the platform performance, two-sidedness presents
itself in the interplay between these decisions. For example, when certain
market parameters change, it may be optimal to reduce the investment in
the performance of the platform and yet increase the price at the same time.
With a slightly lower performance, a platform may become more attractive
to content developers which can indeed justify the higher end-user price in a
content-driven market.
Throughout the paper, we use the video-game industry as an illustrative
example; yet the model is applicable to other two-sided markets with similar
features. For example, providers of smartphones face a similar trade-off of
balancing the needs of application providers and end-users.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related
literature. In Section 3.3, we develop a mathematical model of two compet-
ing platforms that operate in a two-sided market. In Section 3.4, we consider
platforms that enter the market simultaneously. First part of this section as-
sumes that the platform sponsors are price-takers (PT ) whereas in the second
part, this assumption is partially relaxed by allowing the platform sponsors
to set the end-user price in addition to the platform performance (PS). In
Section 3.5, we briefly present the sequential-move counterpart of the same
analysis. Then, we discuss the limitations of our model and possible exten-
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sions in Section 3.6. Finally, Section 3.7 summarizes the results and concludes
the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
There is a burgeoning stream of research pioneered by Parker and Van
Alstyne (2000, 2005) and Rochet and Tirole (2003) on the economic theory of
two-sided markets which focuses on the unique features that set these markets
apart from traditional products and services. In particular, two-sided markets
exhibit a special form of indirect network effects (Katz and Shapiro 1985,
Liebowitz and Margolis 1994) where the number of users on one side of the
market depends on the number of users on the other side. For example, video
game developers will develop games only for platforms that have a sufficiently
big installed base of gamers. Likewise, all else being equal, gamers prefer
platforms that provide a greater variety of games. Due to the presence of
these cross-network effects, a platform sponsor may subsidize one side of the
market in order to attract the other side (Eisenmann et al. 2006). The growing
literature on two-sided markets has mostly focused on these novel two-sided
pricing strategies adopted by platform sponsors (Parker and Alstyne 2000,
Parker and Alstyne 2005, Armstrong 2006, Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Hagiu
2006, Rochet and Tirole 2003, Rochet and Tirole 2006).
Specifically, Parker and Van Alstyne (2000, 2005) characterize the pric-
ing structure of a monopolist platform and show that either side of the market
may be subsidized depending on the relative network externality benefits. Ro-
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chet and Tirole (2003) develop the two-sided pricing strategies for a wide range
of governance structures including competing profit and non-profit platforms.
Similarly, Armstrong (2006) analyze both monopolistic and competing plat-
forms, and show that the pricing structure depends on the relative strengths
of cross-side network effects, the fee structure and whether the agents are able
to join more than one platform.
Two-sided markets literature has provided valuable insights on the role
of pricing strategy in capturing demand on both sides of the market. Yet, very
little has been done to explore the use of non-price controls. There is a recent
body of work discussing the non-price levers platform sponsors can use to
create more attractive bundles for the end-users (Gawer and Cusumano 2002,
Boudreau and Hagiu 2008, Parker and Alstyne 2008, Eisenmann, Parker and
Alstyne 2007). However, the role of platform characteristics such as platform
features and performance has been largely ignored. On the other hand, there
is a substantial body of research on product development that investigates
these issues for traditional products and services. For instance, marketing
based studies in the product development literature have extensively analyzed
how to determine the target values of attributes of a product (see Green and
Srinivasan 1990 for a review) whereas operations management based studies
have focused on determining the design parameters that will optimize product
performance (see Papalambros 1995 for a review). For a broader view of the
product development research, we refer the reader to the survey papers in this
area (Krishnan and Ulrich 2001, Shane and Ulrich 2004). Our paper brings
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together product development and two-sided markets literatures by analyzing
a platform sponsor’s investment in platform performance as a non-price control
to “get the two sides on board”.
There are very few studies in the two-sided markets literature that focus
on platform design issues such as platform quality and features. Bhargava and
Choudhary (2004) analyze the product line design (or “versioning”) problem
of an information intermediary showing that when the buyers have constant
marginal valuations for the service quality, versioning is optimal. A study
that is closer to this paper is by Zhu and Iansiti (2009), who consider two
platforms, an incumbent and an entrant, competing on the basis of platform
quality and installed base. The authors analyze a dynamic game and show
that installed base does not necessarily present barriers to entry. Our paper,
on the other hand, mainly focuses on how investment in platform performance
differs from product development strategies in the absence of cross-network
effects. Further, in Zhu and Iansiti (2009) developers’ cost is independent of
the platform quality, whereas the (direct or indirect) adverse effect of high
platform performance on development costs and the resulting performance
trade-off is at the core of our model.
3.3 The Model
This section describes the two-sided market model that we use to an-
alyze platform performance investment decisions in the presence of cross-
network externalities. Throughout the paper, we draw on the video-game
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industry as an illustrative example. In line with the previous literature on
two-sided markets, we use the terms end-user, content developer and platform
sponsor to correspond to gamers, game developers and game console providers
respectively.
We assume that content developers may choose to affiliate with more
than one platform, i.e. “multihome”, whereas end-users purchase a single
game console; i.e. “singlehome”. The assumption that content developers may
multihome is based on the current trend of publishing multi-platform games,
which is anticipated to prevail due to the growing cost of game development
(Reisinger 2009, Nutt 2008). End-users, on the other hand, are assumed to
singlehome since it is not very common to own more than one platform of the
same generation. Further, it can be argued that as more developers produce
multi-platform content, fewer end-users will choose to multihome; because the
amount of content that is exclusive to a platform outside the end-user’s access
will be limited (Dutka 2009). In general, it is not common to see platforms
where both sides multihome, since if every agent on one side of the market
joins all platforms there is no incentive for any agent on the other side of the
market to join more than one platform (Armstrong 2006).
Because they are able to multihome, content developers decide whether
or not to join a particular platform independently from their participation
decision for the other platform (ignoring any budget constraints). End-users,
on the other hand, need to decide which platform to join, creating competition




φi Performance of platform i
pi End-user price of platform i
Di End-user market share of platform i
Ni Content developer market share of platform i
αg Content price
γ Royalty per content sold (γ < αg)
βg Content development cost per unit performance
M Fixed cost a content developer incurs for joining a platform
K Platform development cost per unit performance squared
c Marginal cost of platform production
αc End-users’ utility from an additional unit of content available
βc End-users’ utility from an additional unit of platform performance
t Degree of platform differentiation on the end-user market
(i = 1, 2) to purchase the platform whereas content developers pay a royalty of
γ per content sold. We assume that there is perfect competition among content
developers, hence contents cost αg regardless of the developer. Indeed, in the
video game industry, game prices are more or less the same at the release
date irrespective of the developer and the console they are developed for. For
the ease of exposition, it is also assumed that γ and αg are the same for both
platforms. Hence, the explicitly modeled dimensions of platform differentiation
are platform performance φi and end-user price pi (i = 1, 2). Depending on
these attributes, platform i gets Di percent of the end-user market and Ni
percent of the developer market (i = 1, 2). The prospect of these market
shares plays a major role in the platform choice of end-users and content
developers.
The value an end-user obtains from purchasing a platform has two
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major components: platform performance and the availability of content for
the platform. Each component has a certain weight in an end-user’s decision.
Let αc be an end-user’s utility from an additional unit of content available
4 and
βc be an end-user’s utility from an additional unit of platform performance.
The utility of end-users from joining platform i (i = 1, 2) is
ui = αcNi + βcφi − pi (3.1)
To determine the end-user market shares, we use the Hotelling’s linear city
model: Individual end-users are assumed to be uniformly located along a unit
interval and the platforms are located at the opposite ends of the interval. Let
t be the “transportation cost” parameter in the Hotelling model, which repre-
sents the degree of horizontal product differentiation between the platforms.
Note that low t implies less product differentiation; thus a higher degree of
competition. Without loss of generality, assume that Platform 1 is located at
point 0 whereas Platform 2 is located at point 1. Accordingly, the net utility
from joining Platform 1 for the end-user x located at x ∈ [0, 1] is:
uxi = αcNi + βcφi − pi − tx
By locating the marginal end-user that is indifferent between the two platforms
and using the fact that end-users are uniformly distributed on a unit interval,
the fraction of end-users that join platform i (i = 1, 2) can be calculated as:




4We assume that αc accounts for the cost of the content as well; i.e. αcNi is the net
benefit from content availability
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We normalize the market size to 1; hence Di is equivalent to the number of
end users joining the platform i.
We assume that a content developer’s revenue has two components:
For all developers, joining platform i generates a base revenue determined by
the end-user market share of the platform, Di, and the platform performance,
φi, (i = 1, 2). Further, each developer has an additional random component of
revenue εj to account for the “hit factor”: Content that meets user needs more
successfully generates more revenues, such as “hit” games. From each unit of
content sold, a content developer earns αg but has to pay γ as royalty to the
platform sponsor. We assume αg ≥ γ to guarantee that content developers
have nonnegative margins. Under the assumption that end-users purchase
every content developed for the platform5, the revenue of content developer j
for developing content for platform i, Rj,i,is given as follows:
Rj,i = Di(αg − γ) + εj
Content developers incur a development cost, which increases with the
platform’s performance. For simplicity, this cost is modeled as βgφi where βg
is the cost of content development per unit performance. There is also a fixed
cost M associated with developing content for a platform, independent from
the platform’s performance. For example, in the video-game industry, game
developers need to purchase the software development kit before developing for
5This assumption can easily be relaxed without affecting the results qualitatively by
assuming each end-user on average buys a certain fraction of the available content.
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a specific platform. Further, hiring new employees or training the employees
to develop for a new platform also results in a fixed cost. Content developers
are assumed to be profit maximizers. Accordingly, by normalizing the op-
portunity cost to zero, it can be seen that a potential content developer for
platform i (i = 1, 2) enters the market if Di(αg − γ) + εj − βgφi−M ≥ 0. For
simplicity, we assume that the random component in a content developer’s
revenue is uniformly distributed, εj ∈ U [0, 1]. Hence, the maximum excess
revenue a developer can get from the hit factor is normalized to 1. Further,
we assume M < 1 on the grounds that the fixed cost of joining a platform is
unlikely to exceed the most successful content’s excess revenue. Under these
assumptions, the marginal developer m, who is indifferent between developing
and not developing content for platform i (i = 1, 2) is characterized with εm
such that:
εm = βgφi +M −Di(αg − γ)
Accordingly, content developers with εj ≥ εm join platform i (i = 1, 2).
We normalize the size of the content developer market to 1; hence the number
of content developers who join platform i (i = 1, 2) as a function of performance
decisions and the end-user market share is given by
Ni(φi, Di) = 1− βgφi −M +Di(αg − γ) (3.3)
To calculate the end-user market share, we substitute (3.3) and (3.1)
into (3.2) to get
Di(φi, φ−i) = 1/2 (1 +
(φi − φ−i)(βc − αcβg)
t− αc(αg − γ)
) (3.4)
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Further substituting (3.4) into (3.3), we get




(φi − φ−i)(βc − αcβg)
t− αc(αg − γ)
) (3.5)
The platform sponsors are profit maximizers. They have two sources of
revenues: Revenue collected from the end-users who purchase the platform and
the royalty revenue collected from content developers from each content they
sell to the end-users. There is a fixed cost of developing the platform, which is
assumed to be a convex increasing function of platform performance given as
Kφ2i . For ease of exposition, the marginal cost of production, c, is assumed to
be constant6 and identical for both platforms. Accordingly, platform sponsor
i’s (i = 1, 2) profit function, πi is as follows:
πi(φi, φ−i) = (pi − c)Di(φi, φ−i) + γDi(φi, φ−i)Ni(φi, φ−i)−Kφ2i (3.6)
where Di(φi, φ−i) and Ni(φi, φ−i) are given by (3.4) and (3.5) respectively.
The analysis of the market equilibrium that arises from this model de-
pends on the timing of the decisions and the pricing power of the platform
sponsors. In terms of the timing of the decisions, platforms may make their
decisions simultaneously (a simultaneous-move game) or there may be a leader
and a follower in the market (a sequential-move game). In terms of the pricing
power, the platforms may be price-takers or price-setters. We start with ana-
lyzing the simultaneous move game for price-taker and price-setting platforms,
6All of our results still hold qualitatively if the marginal cost is linearly increasing in
platform performance; i.e. cφi where c is a constant.
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both of which yield analytically tractable results. In Section 3.5, we briefly
look at the impact of a leader-follower structure for which we mostly rely on
numeric analysis.
3.4 Analysis: Simultaneous-move game
In this section, we consider two competing platforms that enter the
market simultaneously; in other words both platforms make their decisions
without observing the competitor’s decisions. We analyze two main scenarios:
A duopoly of price-taker platforms versus a duopoly of platforms that can set
the end-user price in addition to platform performance.
3.4.1 A duopoly of price-takers
Analyzing price-taker platforms enables us to focus on platform perfor-
mance as a tool to capture demand in a two-sided market. By singling out the
performance choice, the interplay between end-users’ preferences and content
developers’ constraints becomes more evident. The assumption of price-taker
platforms fits the video-game industry reasonably well. Largely because of the
price sensitivity of gamers, console providers almost behave as price-takers.
Harvard Business School case for Sega Enterprises provides an interesting ac-
count on the degree of gamers’ price sensitivity: For Sega, a price choice that
exceeds the post-price war bottom by 25% is estimated to drop the inclination
to buy among the target market by 60-70%. (Thomke 1999). Hence, gamers’
price sensitivity puts a strict upper limit on the console price. On the other
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hand, the significant costs involved in the development and manufacturing of
game consoles put a strict lower limit on the price, making the price-taker
assumption a reasonable fit.
Consider two competing price-taker (PT) platforms. Specifically, plat-
form sponsors commit to the end-user price pi in advance, which leaves plat-
form performance as the only lever to capture demand on both sides of the
market. Accordingly, a platform sponsor’s decision problem is as follows:
max
φi≥0
(pi − c)Di(φi, φ−i) + γDi(φi, φ−i)Ni(φi, φ−i)−Kφ2i
s.t. φi ≥ 0 (3.7)
We first analyze a benchmark case where platforms commit to the same
end-user price. This special case is tractable, which enables us to provide
analytical results. Then, we provide some insights for the general case where
this assumption is relaxed.
3.4.1.1 A Duopoly of Price-takers with Symmetric Platforms
In this section, we analyze two competing platforms that enter the
market simultaneously and commit to the same end-user platform price; i.e.
p1 = p2 = p. In other words, we consider a duopolistic platform market where
the two firms commit to equal prices and compete on performance. Accord-
ingly, we solve (3.7) for both platforms simultaneously and obtain a symmetric
equilibrium where both platform sponsors choose the following performance
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mpvφ − γ(tβg − βc(αg − γ))
βgγvφ − 4Kχ
(3.8)
where vφ = βc − αcβg, χ = αc(αg − γ)− t and mp = (p− c+ γ(1−M)).
vφ provides a measure of the market value of platform performance.
When vφ is negative end-users tend to value content availability more than
they value platform performance whereas content developers suffer from a
high content development cost per unit performance. In that case, a high
platform performance is not appreciated in the market; hence the value of
platform performance is low. On the other hand, when vφ is positive, content
development cost per unit performance is not prohibitive whereas end-users’
utility from platform performance is significant; which implies a high market
value of platform performance. The competition factor χ, on the other hand,
is a rough measure of the strength of competition relative to the strength
of cross-network effects. When χ is negative, there is not much competition
between the two platforms in the end-user market and the networks effects are
weak whereas a positive χ implies a highly competitive market with significant
network effects. Finally, mp provides an aggregate measure for the platform
sponsors’ margin. We assume that mp ≥ 0 for the platform sponsors to stay in
business. Even if the end-user price is below marginal cost, the royalty revenue
can compensate to result in a positive margin. This allows our framework to
7The expression in (3.8) is the unconstrained performance decision; i.e. the constraint
φ ≥ 0 is not enforced. To ensure φPT ≥ 0, we restrict the parameter space, as explained in
Appendix B.1
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account for the widely seen phenomenon of pricing below marginal cost in one
side of the market (Parker and Alstyne 2005)
From Lemma B.1.1 (in Appendix B), market participation in the de-
veloper side occurs only when vφ and χ have opposite signs. In other words,
under our assumptions there are two types of markets in which the platforms
can profitably do business. In the first type, the content-driven market, mar-
ket value of platform performance is low, yet the competition factor is high.
This implies that end-users highly value content availability and that the per-
formance difference between the two platforms is less consequential for their
decision. In the second type, the performance driven market, end-users’ focus
shifts to the performance of the platform. Additionally, the two platforms
are differentiated enough to appeal to different segments of end-users alleviat-
ing the intensity of competition. For the video-game industry, the first type
would correspond to a market dominated by “casual gamers”, whereas the
second would be a predominantly “hard-core gamers” market. Even though
both terms are loosely defined, it is generally assumed that hard-core gamers
appreciate the graphical and processing capabilities of a game console to a
better extent compared to casual gamers. On the other hand, casual gamers
are typically interested in casual games that are quick to access, easy to learn,
and that do not require gaming expertise or regular time commitment to play
(Casual Games Association 2007).
The performance investment at equilibrium presents some interesting
features that would not be observed in the absence of cross-network effects.
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We uncover some of these features in Proposition 3.4.1 through comparative
statics analysis.8
Proposition 3.4.1. At equilibrium, the platform performance φPT is:
i) decreasing in the end-users’ utility from platform performance, βc, if
market value of performance vφ is negative and competition factor χ is
positive.9
ii) decreasing in the degree of competition among the platforms in the end-
user market, if market value of performance vφ is negative and competi-
tion factor χ is positive.
iii) decreasing in the content developer’s revenue per content, αg, if market
value of performance vφ is negative and competition factor χ is positive.
iv) increasing in the end-users’ utility form content availability, αc, if tβg −
βc(αg − γ) ≤ 0.
In a one-sided market if consumers highly value the performance of a
product, competition would drive firms to offer higher performance. Proposi-
tion 3.4.1 i) shows that this is not necessarily the case in two sided markets.
In particular, platform sponsors may choose to reduce their investment in
8All proofs are provided in the Appendix B.
9Throughout the paper unless otherwise specified, we mean increasing and decreasing in
the weak sense.
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platform performance in response to increasing end-user utility from perfor-
mance. The fundamental reason behind this counterintuitive result is the fact
that platform performance and content availability act as substitutes for the
end-users. Consider a highly competitive platform market characterized by
end-users with high preference for content availability and content developers
that have a high development cost per unit performance; in other words, con-
sider a content-driven market. In such a market, a platform sponsor might
be better off by decreasing the investment in the performance of the platform
when end-users’ utility from performance increases. Due to the high content
development cost per unit performance, a slight decrease in the platform’s
performance may have a big impact on attracting new content developers,
which ultimately attracts end-users as they enjoy a high utility from content
availability.
Part ii) presents a similar result for the relation between the degree of
competition and the platform performance. In the absence of cross-network
effects, if competition between two firms intensifies, one would expect a higher
investment in performance at equilibrium. However, in a two-sided market
platform performance decreases as the competitiveness in the end-user market
intensifies if the competition factor is high but the market value of platform
performance is low. Similar to part i), this stems from the substitution ef-
fect between content availability and platform performance. When the market
value for platform performance is low, instead of providing a platform with
higher performance as a response to increasing competition, the platform spon-
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sors may be better-off investing slightly less in performance and getting content
developers on board.
Part iii) can be interpreted in a similar fashion. For a two-sided market,
the investment in platform performance may drop in response to an increase
in the content price if the market is content-driven. Even though a higher
content price could easily demand an increase in platform performance, when
end-users value content availability more than they value the performance of
the platform, a lower performance choice that lowers the content development
cost and attracts more content developers is more desirable for the platforms.
In the first three parts of Proposition 3.4.1, we observe that conven-
tional wisdom would mislead a platform sponsor in a content driven market.
In part iv), conventional wisdom fails if the end-users have a high valuation for
platform performance, as in the case of hard-core gamers. When the end-users’
utility from content availability increases, a platform sponsor may choose to
invest less in the performance of the platform for the sake of attracting more
content developers, which attracts the end-users. However, this may not be
the the best response in a highly competitive platform market characterized by
end-users with a high utility from platform performance and content develop-
ers that enjoy a high margin in addition to a development cost structure that
is not significantly affected by platform performance. In such markets, higher
performance makes the platform significantly more attractive for the end-users
whereas it does not increase the development cost of the content developers
as much; hence the platform sponsor is better off increasing the platform per-
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formance when end-users’ utility from content availability increases.
Overall, Proposition 3.4.1 implies that a firm may overinvest or under-
invest in platform performance should the cross-network effects be ignored or
miscalculated. Note that except for part iv) this happens in a content-driven
market.
3.4.1.2 A Duopoly of Price-takers with Asymmetric Platforms
In this section, we relax the assumption that the two platforms commit
to the same end-user price. This general case is not tractable, even though
closed-form solutions for (φ1, φ2) still exist. Yet, we are able to provide some
insights through numeric analysis.
Figure 3.2: An example market segmentation under high competition
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An asymmetric duopoly presents a richer variety of market segmenta-
tion scenarios among which exist ones that mimic Wii’s success story. In other
words, we observe that the platform with a lower investment in performance
may be the market leader. The following example represents a highly compet-
itive end-user market where Platform 1 commits to a slightly lower end-user
price compared to Platform 2. The bottom left corner of Figure 3.2 shows
that when end-user utility from content availability (αc) and end-user utility
from platform performance (βc) are both low, neither platform succeeds in
attracting users. In the “Wii” region, Platform 1 has a lower performance, yet
still captures a bigger market share on both sides of the market. Note that
this is most likely to happen in a market characterized by high end-user utility
from content availability and a relatively low end-user utility from platform
performance. The “Xbox” region, on the other hand, shows where the more
expensive and higher performance platform becomes the market leader. Note
that this requires a sufficiently high utility from platform performance. This
market segmentation scenario shows us that making the biggest investment
in the platform technology does not necessarily bring market leadership. In
content driven markets, the key to capturing demand is triggering third party
development.
To complete the analysis, we look into the relation between the com-
mitted price pi and the equilibrium performance. We first observe that in
line with conventional wisdom if a platform sponsor commits to a higher end-
user price, it offers a higher performance platform. The effect of competitor’s
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end-user price on a platform’s performance choice turns out to be more subtle
though.
Figure 3.3: Relationship between platform performance φPTi and the competi-
tor’s end user price p−i depends on the market value of performance, vφ
That is best explained with an example. In Figure 3.3, the horizontal
axis is the price of Platform 1 and the vertical axis represents the platform
performance. On the left panel, it can be seen that the performance of Plat-
form 2 decreases as the price of Platform 1 increases, while on the right panel
it increases as the price of Platform 1 increases. The settings on the two panels
are identical except for the end-user utility from the platform performance and
the end-user utility from content availability. When the end-users’ utility from
platform performance is higher compared to their utility from content avail-
ability, for example in a performance-driven market, the platform sponsor is
better off increasing the performance as a response to increasing end-user price
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of the competitor. On the other hand when the end-users’ utility from plat-
form performance is low, for example in a content-driven market, the platform
sponsor is able to have a less aggressive investment in platform performance
taking advantage of the competitor’s increased price.
3.4.2 A Duopoly of Price-setting Platforms
In this section, we partially relax the price-taking assumption by allow-
ing the platform sponsors to determine the end-user price. However, royalty
collected from the content developers is still exogenous to the model, since it
is not possible to obtain closed form solutions when platform sponsors deter-
mine the two-sided pricing strategy and platform performance simultaneously.
Accordingly, a price-setting platform sponsor’s decision problem is as follows:
max
φi≥0;pi
(pi − c)Di(φi, φ−i) + γDi(φi, φ−i)Ni(φi, φ−i)−Kφ2i (3.9)
s.t. φi ≥ 0
When two symmetric platform sponsors determine the end-user price and the
platform performance simultaneously, the price-setting (PS) equilibrium is
symmetric with both platforms setting the end-user price and platform per-
formance specified in Lemma 3.4.2
Lemma 3.4.2. If vPS = βc − βg(αc + γ) ≥ 0, platforms play the high perfor-
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mance equilibrium given by
φPSH =
βc − βg(αc + γ)
4K
pPSH = βgγ
βc − βg(αc + γ)
4K
+ t+ c− γ(1−M + αg − γ)− αc(αg − γ)
= βgγφ
PS
H + t+ c− γ(1−M + αg − γ)− αc(αg − γ)
Otherwise, the low performance equilibrium (L) is played with zero investment
in platform performance:
φPSL = 0
pPSL = t+ c− γ(1−M + αg − γ)− αc(αg − γ)
Hence, when two competing symmetric platforms set the end-user price
and platform performance simultaneously, end-users’ utility from platform per-
formance must be relatively high and content development cost per unit perfor-
mance must be relatively low for the platforms to positively invest in platform
performance. On the other hand, if end-users tend to value content availabil-
ity more than they value platform performance and content developers suffer
from a high content development cost per unit performance as well as a high
royalty rate, a high platform performance is not appreciated in the market
which induces the platforms to play the low performance equilibrium.
Looking at closely to these equilibrium decisions show that the equilib-
rium performance level behaves quite differently compared to the price-taker
equilibrium, as summarized in Proposition 3.4.3.
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Proposition 3.4.3. In a price-setting duopoly where platform sponsors set the
end-user price and platform performance decisions simultaneously, the follow-
ing holds for the platform performance at equilibrium:
i) φPS increases with end-users’ utility from an additional unit of platform
performance, βc
ii) φPS decreases with end-users’ utility from an additional unit of content
available, αc
iii) φPS decreases with royalty rate, γ.
iv) φPS decreases with content development cost per unit performance, βg.
v) φPS does not depend on the intensity of competition in the end-user
market, t
Proposition 3.4.3 shows us that in a simultaneous-move game, if the
platform sponsors have the degree of freedom to set the end-user price in ad-
dition to the platform performance, the equilibrium performance in the market
is immune to the counterintuitive effects of two-sidedness that were presented
in Proposition 3.4.1. The reason behind this is two-folds. First, note that most
of the counterintuitive effects in Proposition 3.4.1 are observed in a content
driven-market where vφ = βc − αcβg ≤ 0. However, when vφ is negative, so is
vPS implying that the price-setting platforms choose not to invest in platform
performance at all (by Lemma 3.4.2). Note that high performance is costly
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to the platform providers in two ways, being the fixed cost of developing the
platform and the risk of reduced participation from the developer side. Hence,
in a content driven market where the value of platform performance is low,
the tendency to avoid investing in platform performance is intuitive. In the
absence of a second leverage though, price-taker platforms are not always able
to avoid investing in platform performance; rather they manage that invest-
ment to balance the cross-network effects, whereas price-setting platforms can
and do avoid investing. But this implies that performance choice no longer
provides leverage for price-setting platforms in a content driven market as
their key leverage becomes the end-user price. As a result, the counterintu-
itive effects observed for price-taker platforms do not apply to price-setting
platforms.
Table 3.2: Comparative Statics in the simultaneous-move game
Conventional Wisdom Price Taker Duopoly Price Setting Duopoly
(Proposition 3.4.1) (Proposition 3.4.3)
βc φ
∗ ↑ φ∗ ↑ or ↓ φ∗ ↑
t φ∗ ↑ φ∗ ↑ or ↓ φ∗doesn′tchange
αc φ
∗ ↓ φ∗ ↑ or ↓ φ∗ ↓
γ φ∗ ↓ φ∗ ↑ or ↓ φ∗ ↓
αg φ
∗ ↑ φ∗ ↑ or ↓ φ∗ ↑
The second reason has to do with the curse of choice. In a competitive
setting, the additional pricing power may trigger a price war which constrains
the ability of platforms to adopt some counterintuitive yet profitable strategies.
For instance, Part iv) of Proposition 3.4.1 suggests that a price-taker platform
may choose to increase the platform performance when end-users’ utility from
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content availability, αc, increases. On the other hand, price-setting platforms
take the more intuitive action and reduce the platform performance. However
they also cut back the end-user price in order to stay competitive whereas com-
mitment to the platform price enables the price-taker platforms to afford an
increase in the platform performance, which turns out to be a more profitable
strategy under certain market conditions.
Comparing the profits earned by price-taker versus price-setting plat-
forms reveal the following:
Proposition 3.4.4. Consider two symmetric platforms simultaneously enter-
ing the market.
i) If end-users’ utility from platform performance, βc, increases, the profit
of a price-setting platform always decreases. However, the profit of a
price-taker platform actually increases if the market is content driven.
ii) If the degree of competition increases, the profit of a price-setting plat-
form always decreases. However, the profit of a price-taker platform
actually increases if the market is content driven.
Proposition 3.4.4 provides another example for how the additional pric-
ing power may be a drawback. For example in the presence of pricing power
if competition intensifies, platforms engage in a price war, which draws down
the profits. However, as shown in Proposition 3.4.1, price-taker platforms may
respond to increasing competition by lowering the platform performance in
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a content-driven market. In this case, platform development costs go down
and the platform becomes more attractive for developers with its low cost
of content development. End-users lose some utility due to the reduction in
platform performance, yet this loss is easily compensated by increased content
availability. Hence, price-taker platforms simultaneously entering the mar-
ket may actually benefit from increased competition if the market is content
driven. Similarly, an increase in end-users’ utility from platform performance
may benefit price-taker platforms in a content-driven market, but never helps
price-setting platforms.
Finally, contrary to the intuition that high performance goes together
with high price, we observe that in response to a change in certain market
characteristics, end-user price may increase despite a decrease in the platform
performance.
Proposition 3.4.5. Consider a duopoly of price-setting platforms simultane-
ously entering the market.
i) When content development cost per unit performance, βg, increases, equi-
librium price pPS may increase even though equilibrium performance φPS
always decreases.
ii) When royalty rate, γ, increases, equilibrium price pPS may increase even
though equilibrium performance φPS always decreases .
An increase in content development cost per unit performance results
in a decrease in platform performance at equilibrium. Accordingly, in the
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absence of cross-network effects one would expect the equilibrium price to
decrease on the grounds that a lower performance platform would deserve a
lower price. However, Proposition 3.4.5 shows that optimal price may actu-
ally increase because by reducing the platform performance, it is possible to
attract more content developers which may justify a higher end-user price.
Similarly, end-user price may increase when the royalty rate increases despite
an accompanying decrease in platform performance.
3.5 Sequential-move game
In this section, we analyze two competing platforms, one of them being
the market leader. The follower enters the market after observing the decisions
made by the leader, i.e. the core performance of the leader’s platform and if
the platforms are not price takers, the end-user price set by the leader. The
leader anticipates the follower’s response and takes that into account in mak-
ing his decisions. Note that the sequential move-games analyzed in this paper
are not dynamic in nature. We assume that even though the follower enters
the market late, the leader does not accumulate an installed base in the mean
time. This assumption would fit to a situation where the two platform sponsors
make their decisions sequentially but they deliver the products to the market
simultaneously. Another possible scenario is that the follower announces its
entry in advance and rational agents (end-users and content developers) antic-
ipate the performance and price decisions of the follower. Accordingly, if the
agents prefer the follower’ s platform, they wait for the release of that platform
75
without incurring a loss of utility due to waiting.
In the sequential-move game even though closed form solutions for the
equilibrium exist, the results are quite intractable, especially for the case of
price-taker platforms. Hence, we briefly comment on the price-taker duopoly
based on numerical experiments and further elaborate on the price-setting
duopoly.
3.5.1 A price-taker duopoly
When we solve the decision problem (3.7) sequentially using backwards
induction, we first observe that unlike the simultaneous-move game with sym-
metric platforms, the equilibrium is not necessarily symmetric. Indeed, the
follower may make a lower or a higher performance investment than the leader
even if they commit to the same end-user price. Whether the follower chooses
a higher core performance depends on a complicated set of factors. For ex-
ample, in Figure 3.4, the dashed line is the follower and the solid line is the
leader. The follower commits to a slightly higher end-user price. Yet, commit-
ting to a higher price does not necessarily imply investing more on platform
performance. When end-users’ utility from platform performance is high, the
leader adopts a more aggressive strategy of performance investment despite
its price advantage.
More importantly, we observe that the counterintuitive comparative
statics results obtained in Section 3.4.1.1 still hold qualitatively for the sequential-
move game. In other words, irrespective of the type of game played between
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Figure 3.4: The follower’s platform may have a higher or a lower performance
than the leader’s
price-taker platforms, it is possible to have the equilibrium performance de-
crease with end-users’ utility from platform performance βc, product differ-
entiation in the end-user market, t and content price αg and increase with
end-users’ utility from content availability, αc and the royalty rate, γ.
3.5.2 A duopoly with price-setting platforms
Analyzing a sequential-move game between price-setting platforms un-
cover interesting insights on the different strategies employed by the market
leader and the follower. For instance, the follower and the leader respond
differently to changes in the content price αg and in the degree of product
differentiation t, as shown in Proposition 3.5.1.
Proposition 3.5.1. Consider a price-setting duopoly of platforms. The leader
and the follower respond in opposite directions to changes in:
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i) content price αg
ii) degree of product differentiation t
If the leader increases its platform’s performance in response to a change in
αg or t, the follower reduces, and vice versa.
The leader indeed takes advantage of moving first when responding to
the changes in content price. For example, in a market dominated by ca-
sual gamers, when game price increases it may be more profitable to further
reduce the platform’s core performance to attract more game developers be-
cause ultimately that is what gamers value the most. However, we see that
when the leader adopts this strategy, it is no longer profitable for the follower
to adopt it. Hence, the follower ends up increasing the performance of its
platform. We observe a similar strategy difference in platforms’ responses to
changes in the degree of competition. Note that in the simultaneous-move
game between price-setting platforms, a change in the degree of competition
is only reflected in the equilibrium price decision. However, if there is a leader
and a follower in the market, competition in the end-user market affects the
performance decisions as well. More interestingly, the leader and the follower
respond in opposite directions. In particular, we observe that when competi-
tion decreases, the leader takes advantage by decreasing the performance of
the platform and increasing the end-user price as long as end-users’ utility from
platform performance is not too high. However, this leaves the follower with
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little room to decrease its performance in a profitable manner so the follower
has to differentiate itself by increasing the platform performance instead.
3.6 Discussion
In platform markets, “winner-take-all” outcomes are commonly ob-
served due to network externalities. Often, platforms engage in fierce com-
petition and the winner becomes a standard, as was the case with Windows,
PDF, DVD, fax and others. Accordingly, the conventional wisdom is to heav-
ily invest in the core performance or features of the platform to get the upper
hand in the race. However, our results show that high performance does not
always gives the competitive edge. In content-driven markets, the platform
with a lower performance can indeed become the market leader. Nintendo
Wii’s success despite its low performance provides an example for that.
Our model characterizes a content-driven market as one with low mar-
ket value of performance yet with high degree of competition between the
platforms. In terms of the end-user preferences, this implies more emphasis on
content availability and variety than the core performance of the platform. In
terms of the content developers, this implies significantly higher development
costs when developing for high performance platforms. As the video-game in-
dustry expanded its target market beyond the “hard core gamers” to include
more and more “casual gamers”, demand for better performance has been
on the decline (Sheffield 2008), triggering a shift to a content-driven market.
Adding the ever rising costs of game development for the current generation
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technology, a platform like Wii that almost relies on the previous generation
technology gains a competitive advantage in attracting game developers. In
a market where it is the games that matter, once the game developers are on
board, so are the gamers.
It took the game industry some time to recognize that the average
gamer does not ask for better graphics or better sound capabilities than what
Nintendo Wii offers (Sheffield 2008). Indeed, there is usually a temptation
to overinvest in the core technology of a platform. The fundamental message
this paper delivers is that outperforming the competition sometimes just boils
down to facilitating third party development better.
We used a stylized model to uncover these insights. Perhaps the most
restrictive of our assumptions is that the end-user market size is fixed. This
assumption is implicit in the Hotelling model, variants of which are frequently
used in the two-sided markets literature (Parker and Alstyne 2000, Armstrong
2002, Rochet and Tirole 2003, Armstrong 2006, Armstrong and Wright 2007,
Anderson and Coate 2005, Kaiser and Wright 2006). Fixed market size simpli-
fies the analysis to a great extent but also presents a limitation because strate-
gies that could expand or fail to attract the total market are not accounted
for. Hence, our model is more useful to understand performance investment
strategies that sustain the current market rather than those that change the
game completely.
Throughout the analysis we assume that content developers are able to
multihome whereas end-users choose to join a single platform. This framework
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fits the video-game industry fairly well; however, it does not directly extend
to markets where platforms make exclusivity deals with content developers. If
each developer works exclusively for a particular platform, in other words if
both sides of the market singlehome, the platform sponsors have to compete
in both sides of the market; thus the network effects become more critical.
Our preliminary analysis on this framework shows that the main results for
the performance investment strategy such as the counterintuitive trends pre-
sented in Proposition 3.4.1 continue to hold qualitatively. However, pricing in
a two-sided single-homing framework presents some distinctions. A detailed
comparison between the two frameworks is left as future research.
Finally, we study single-period models of competition between plat-
forms. It would be interesting to analyze performance investment strategies of
incumbents and entrants in a dynamic framework. Our single-period analysis
of a sequential move game does not account for the installed base advantage
of the early mover, as the market is cleared simultaneously even though the
decisions are made sequentially.
3.7 Conclusions
Platform development and design is a dimension of two-sided markets
that has not been adequately addressed in the literature. In this paper, we
explore the performance investment strategies of competing platforms in a two-
sided market. We focus on a platform sponsor’s trade-off between developing
a high performance platform that matches the end-user’s preferences and sac-
81
rificing some of those preferences in exchange for improved or less costly third
party development capabilities. We show that conventional wisdom about
product development decisions may be misleading in the presence of strong
cross-network externalities.
We first characterize content-driven and performance-driven markets.
Market value of platform performance as well as the degree of differentiation
between the platforms is low in the former and high in the latter. Conventional
wisdom may be especially misleading in a content-driven market. For instance,
in a one-sided market if the degree of competition between the firms is higher,
one would expect to see more aggressive investment in the performance of the
product. However, we show that in a content-driven market platform sponsors
are better off decreasing the investment in platform performance and providing
greater content availability instead.
More importantly, we show that when platforms are price-takers, a
platform with a lower performance can indeed become the market leader, sim-
ilar to Nintendo Wii’s success against its high performance competitors Xbox
and PS3. In other words, contrary to the conventional wisdom about “winner-
take-all” markets, heavily investing in the core performance of a platform with
strong cross-network effects may not yield a competitive edge. Our results sug-
gest that offering a platform with lower performance but greater availability
of content may be a better strategy, particularly in content-driven markets.
When platforms are able to set the end-user price in addition to the
platform performance, two-sidedness presents itself in the interplay between
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end-user price and platform performance. For instance, we show that in re-
sponse to changes in certain market parameters, it may be optimal to reduce
the investment in the performance of the platform and increase the price at
the same time, if the reduction in the platform performance is a strong enough
lever to attract more content developers. Finally, we show that in a leader-
follower game, the follower may have to differentiate its platform from that of
the leader by counteracting the leader’s performance decisions. For example,
when competition decreases, we observe that the leader generally seizes the
opportunity by decreasing his investment in platform performance whereas the
follower chooses to increase his investment by exactly the same amount.
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Chapter 4
Dual Sourcing under Random Supply
Capacities:
The Role of the Inferior Supplier
4.1 Introduction
Multiple sourcing is common in practice due to various reasons. First,
firms may make the best cost–responsiveness balance by keeping a cheap off-
shore supplier and an expensive onshore supplier. Allon and Van Mieghem
(2010) provide such an example for a U.S. manufacturer of wireless transmis-
sion components with suppliers in China and Mexico. Second, maintaining a
portfolio of suppliers allows for risk sharing. Supply diversification has become
a common strategy to hedge against possible shortfalls of the supply streams.
Tomlin (2006) recounts two examples that underscore the value of multiple
sourcing in the occasion of supply disruptions. When Hurricane Mitch hit
Central America in 1998, Dole suffered from the supply disruption in the re-
gion, while Chiquita was much less affected because of its larger supplier base.
A similar story is reported after the fire at the Philips plant in 2000. Erics-
son, heavily relying on Philips, was significantly hurt, while Nokia was able to
get around by resorting to its alternative suppliers. Finally, when the output
volume of each individual supplier is insufficient, multiple sourcing becomes a
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must. For instance, Apple has been constrained by the low volume from its
primary supplier, LG Display, for iPad LCD panels. In an attempt to allevi-
ate this capacity restriction, Apple contracted with Samsung as an additional
supplier in early 2010.
In formulating a multiple sourcing strategy, firms must determine the
allocation among different suppliers based on their key characteristics includ-
ing cost, leadtime, reliability and capacity. Intuitively, if one supplier is in-
ferior in all dimensions compared to other suppliers, it seems undesirable to
order exclusively from this supplier or to allocate a major portion of demand
to this supplier. Several previous studies have hinged on these notions. For
example, the presence of a fast and cheap supplier excludes a slow and expen-
sive supplier if both are reliable and uncapacitated (e.g., Fukuda 1964, Allon
and Van Mieghem 2010). Also, a cheaper supplier should be selected before a
more expensive one with the same leadtime if both are unreliable and unca-
pacitated (e.g. Dada, Petruzzi and Schwarz 2007, Federgruen and Yang 2008).
The question is: Do these notions hold in general when the suppliers can differ
from one another in cost, leadtime, reliability and capacity?
To provide the answer, we formulate a multi-period replenishment model.
Specifically, the firm under consideration has two procurement sources, a fast
supplier of one-period leadtime and a slow supplier of two-period leadtime.1
1Such leadtime structure is commonly assumed in the literature to ensure analytical
tractability (e.g., Whittmore and Saunders 1977, Lawson and Porteus 2000, Sethi, Yan and
Zhang 2003).
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The procurement cost of the fast supplier can be higher or lower than that of
the slow supplier. Each supplier operates a random capacity. The firm decides
the order quantities in each period before the supply and demand uncertainties
are resolved.
For the resulting model, the optimal policy is characterized by two re-
order points, one for each supplier. A positive order is only issued to a supplier
if and only if the inventory level is below its reorder point. Interestingly, the
reorder point for the slow supplier can be higher than that for the fast supplier
even if the slow supplier has a higher cost, a lower reliability and a smaller
capacity than the fast one. In other words, it is possible to order exclusively
from a supplier who is inferior in all dimensions –cost, leadtime, reliability,
and capacity.
Such a phenomenon can be driven by either capacity limit or capacity
uncertainty of the fast supplier. In particular, we prove that regardless of its
cost and capacity distribution, the slow supplier’s reorder point exceeds that of
the fast supplier when the latter’s capacity is low enough or when the latter’s
no-delivery probability is high enough. These conditions dampens the fast
supplier’s ability of quick replenishment, leading to a risk of stockout. Such a
risk can be effectively mitigated by a slow order placed in advance, even if the
slow order is expensive and unreliable.
This intriguing observation suggests us to further examine how the firm
should allocate procurement orders between the fast and slow suppliers, who
are otherwise identical. Our analysis suggests that the allocation rule depends
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critically on capacity limit and capacity uncertainty. When the fast supplier
has an ample reliable capacity, the slow supplier is only used as a backup in
the occasion of severe stockout. In contrast, facing a limited or unreliable fast
supply, the firm may rely heavily on the slow supplier. Particularly, the slow
supplier may obtain more than 50% of the order allocation in the long run
even if it has the same cost and capacity distribution as the fast one.
Furthermore, a larger allocation is given to the slow supplier and a
smaller allocation to the fast one when the planning horizon is longer. Such an
allocation scheme leads to a near-perfect match between supply and demand in
the long run—the average delivery quantity approaches the average demand
as the planning horizon extends. Consequently, the total order from both
suppliers is smaller in an earlier period than in a later period. This observation
underscores a key difference between dual sourcing and single sourcing. For
the latter, it is well known that less should be ordered when getting closer to
the end of the horizon (see, e.g., Federgruen and Zipkin 1986).
We also demonstrate that the effect of capacity limit and capacity un-
certainty can play out differently with respect to changes in model parameters.
For example, under unlimited and random supply, an increased demand vari-
ability leads to an increased allocation to the fast order. This is because the
fast supplier, without a capacity limit, is more responsive in reacting to de-
mand shocks than the slow supplier. However, under limited and deterministic
supply, a slow order placed in advance can help to avoid stockouts induced by
large demand variability when the fast supply capacity is limited. Thus, the
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allocation to the slow supplier increases in response to an increased demand
variability.
Our study highlights the role of an inferior supplier in the context of
multiple sourcing. In particular, when the supply capacity is very restrictive or
highly uncertain, firms should order primarily from the slow supplier and use
the fast order as a supplement, even if the slow supplier does not beat the fast
supplier in cost or reliability. This counterintuitive observation underscores
the importance of incorporating cost, leadtime, reliability, and capacity in a
unified framework to evaluate supplier selection and order allocation strategies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In §4.2, we review
the related literature and discuss our contributions. The model is laid out in
§4.3 and the optimal policy is characterized in 4.4. In §4.5, we analyze order
allocation between the fast and slow suppliers via an extensive numerical study.
Section 4.6 concludes and points out the future research directions. All the
proofs are relegated to Appendix C.
4.2 Literature Review
This paper brings together two streams of research. The first con-
cerns sourcing from multiple reliable suppliers, each characterized by a de-
livery leadtime and a procurement cost. This line of study dates back to
Barankin (1961), Daniel (1963) and Fukuda (1964) with further developments
by many others. It is commonly assumed that a supplier with a longer lead-
time charges a lower procurement cost than one with a shorter leadtime. In
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general, the problem involves a large state space of in-transit orders due to
the possibility of order crossing, i.e., an order placed earlier may arrive later.
When this happens, the optimal policy can be quite complex (Whittmore and
Saunders 1977, Feng, Sethi, Yan and Zhang 2006) and one has to resort to
heuristics (e.g., Scheller-Wolf, Veeraraghavan and Houtum 2005, Veeraragha-
van and Scheller-Wolf 2008, Sheopuri, Janakiraman and Seshadri 2010). For
periodic-review systems, one way to exclude order crossing is to assume two
suppliers with consecutive delivery leadtimes, i.e., the leadtimes vary by ex-
actly one period. In fact, the main analytical development of this literature
is restricted to this case (e.g., Fukuda 1964, Lawson and Porteus 2000, Sethi
et al. 2003, Yazlali and Erhun 2009), where the optimality of a base-stock pol-
icy is established. We also assume two suppliers with consecutive leadtimes for
analytical tractability. However, our model adds another layer of complexity
by incorporating uncertain supply capacities, which leads to the suboptimality
of a base-stock type policy.
For the problem of multiple sourcing from reliable suppliers, there are
other ways to reduce the state space of in-transit orders. First, one can restrict
ordering at certain periods and thus eliminate order crossing. Allowing orders
to be placed every N periods, Fukuda (1964) shows that a base-stock policy
can be obtained when the difference between the longest and shortest supply
leadtimes is N periods. Under dual sourcing, this assumption implies at most
one outstanding order at any time (e.g., Chiang and Benton 1994). Second, one
can consider a model with a standing order from a slow supplier and dynamic
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orders from a fast supplier (Allon and Van Mieghem 2010). There has not
been any consideration of supply capacity uncertainty in these models. Our
analysis suggests that the structure of the optimal policy characterized for our
model carries through in the first case. For the second case, the dynamic order
from the fast supplier will follow a base-stock policy as suggested by Ciarallo,
Akella and Morton (1994). In both cases, the main insight obtained from our
model will be preserved. That is, an advance order from the slow supplier
provides the advantage of mitigating the stockout risk. Therefore, the firm
may rely heavily on a slow supplier even if it does not offer cost or reliability
benefit over the fast supplier.
It is worth contrasting our result to that obtained by Allon and Van
Mieghem (2010). They propose a tailored base-surge allocation strategy, which
assigns the base demand to a cheap offshore supplier and the surge demand
to an expensive onshore supplier. This strategy effectively captures the cost–
flexibility trade-off between a slow supplier and a fast supplier. Because their
model does not impose a capacity limit for fast supplier, the allocation policy
derived in their model breaks down if the slow supplier is more expensive
than the fast one. Our model, however, allows such a possibility. While our
analysis also suggests using the slow supplier as the primary source and the
fast one as a supplement, the reason differs from theirs. In their case, the slow
supplier obtains a large allocation due to its advantage of low procurement
cost, whereas such a situation can arise in our model even if the slow supplier
is more expensive.
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The second stream of related research examines supply uncertainty (see
the survey by Yano and Lee 1995), which is commonly modeled as random
yield (Henig and Gerchak 1990), random capacity (Ciarallo et al. 1994, Yang,
Qi and Xia 2005, Chao, Chen and Zheng 2008), or a combination of both
(Wang and Gerchak 1996). Different strategies have been proposed for supply
risk mitigation. For example, Kouvelis and Li (2010) examine the value of
contingent response to observed yield uncertainty. Wang, Gilland and Tomlin
(2010) compare the benefit from improving supply reliability with that from
dual sourcing. Many studies also underscore the importance of supply diversi-
fication in risk mitigation. With continuous demand distributions, it is optimal
to select a cheaper supplier before a more expensive one regardless of the sup-
pliers’ reliability (Anupindi and Akella 1993, Dada et al. 2007, Burke, Carrillo
and Vakharia 2007, Federgruen and Yang 2008, Federgruen and Yang 2009).
With discrete demand distributions, Swaminathan and Shanthikumar (1999)
demonstrate the possibility of ordering only from the expensive supplier whose
reliability is significantly higher than the cheaper supplier. All of these studies
overlook the difference of suppliers’ leadtimes.
Our study combines these streams of literature by examining cost, lead-
time, reliability and capacity in a unified framework. We demonstrate the pos-
sibility of ordering exclusively from and relying heavily on an inferior supplier.
These observations are in stark contrast to the earlier findings.
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4.3 The Model
The firm faces a T -period planning problem. At the beginning of period
t, the inventory level It is reviewed. Then, the firm makes replenishment
decisions for an uncertain demand D with the options to source from a fast
supplier and a slow supplier. In particular, the fast supplier has a delivery
leadtime of one period and the slow one has a leadtime of two periods. When
a fast order of qf,t and a slow order of qs,t are issued, the amounts delivered are
random due to the uncertainties associated with the supply capacities kf and
ks, respectively. We assume that kf , ks, and D are stationary and independent.
The uncertain capacities kf and ks represent the random resource availability
levels for providing the product. For example, the machines and equipment
deployed for production may break down from time to time or deteriorate
over time. The productivity level may fluctuate due to variations in worker
skills or operating conditions. In the case of external sourcing, there may be a
lack of information about the suppliers’ production capabilities and workforce
levels. Even if the information is shared, the suppliers are typically reluctant to
reveal other buyers’ orders, which often have a major influence on the available
supply capacities of the system under consideration.
The ordering quantities from both suppliers must be specified before
the uncertainties in the demand and supply are resolved. At the end of period
t, kf , ks and D are observed. The unmet demand is backordered and the
leftover inventory is carried over to the next period. Specifically, the ending
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inventory for period t is
It+1 = It + qf,t ∧ kf + qs,t−1 ∧ ks −D, (4.1)
where a ∧ b = min{a, b}.
The firm pays cj dollars for each unit received from the order qj,t, j =
f, s. He also pays a surplus/shortage cost H(·) upon the demand realization,
defined as
H(x) = hx+ + px−, (4.2)
where x+ = max{0, x} and x− = max{0,−x}. We assume cf < p and cs < αp
to rule out the trivial cases of never ordering from the fast supplier and the
slow supplier, respectively.
Let Vt(I) denote the optimal cost function in period t when the inven-





Jt(I; qf,t, qs,t) = cfE(qf,t ∧ kf ) + csE(qs,t ∧ ks) + EH(I + qf,t ∧ kf −D)
+αEVt+1(I + qf,t ∧ kf + qs,t ∧ ks −D).
Finally, we impose, without loss of generality, a terminal condition VT+1(I) =
0; yet it should be noted that our analysis also extends to the case of infinite
horizon.
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We shall remark that the policy structure derived from our model car-
ries through for systems with nonstationary cost parameters and those with
Markov-modulated supply and demand processes. Our analysis also extends
to the case when the leadtimes for the fast and slow suppliers are L and (L+1)
periods, provided that the capacities are observed one period after ordering
(see Remark C.0.1).
Using standard dynamic programming arguments, we can show that an
optimal feedback solution always exists (see Theorem C.0.1 in the appendix).
We denote q∗f,t(I) and q
∗
s,t(I) to be the optimal fast and slow orders, respec-
tively, in period t. When multiple solutions exist, we pick the ones with the
smallest slow order and then the one with the smallest fast order.
4.4 The Analysis
In this section, we present a detailed analysis of the problem formu-
lated in §4.3. The properties of the dynamic programming equation obtained
in§4.4.1 facilitate further analytical derivations of the optimal policy in §4.4.2.
4.4.1 The Convexity of the Optimal Cost Function and its Impli-
cations
The major difficulty with our model is that the presence of uncertain
capacity leads to a nonconvex objective function. In particular, Jt(I; qf,t, qs,t)
is not convex in either qf,t or qs,t. We need to understand the behavior of the
optimal cost function before exploring the optimal policy analytically.
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Proposition 4.4.1. The optimal cost function Vt(I) is convex in I for each
t.
When both the fast and slow orders are optimally determined, the re-
sulting expected optimal cost function Vt(I) is convex in the inventory level
I. In other words, the marginal cost of on-hand inventory is increasing. This
result generalizes its counterpart in Ciarallo et al. (1994), who consider or-
dering from a single supplier with random capacity. They derive an optimal
base-stock policy, which in turn leads to the convexity of the optimal cost
function in their model. In contrast, Proposition 4.4.1 is established without
much knowledge of the optimal policy. Therefore, the approach adopted here
is very different from theirs. Moreover, as we will see in §4.4.2, the base-stock
type policy fails to achieve optimality in our model in general.
Proposition 4.4.1 is established based on the following observation (see
a formal treatment in Lemma C.0.2 in Appendix). For a fixed order quantity
from, say, the slow supplier, we compare the expected cost under two alterna-
tives. The first is to order the optimal quantity q∗f,t from a single fast source
with a capacity of kf , and obtain q
∗
f,t∧kf units. In the second alternative, there
are two fast suppliers whose capacities, denoted by kaf and k
b
f , are perfectly
positively correlated and have the same distribution as kf . When orders q
a
and qb are issued, the delivery quantities are θ(qa∧kaf ) and (1−θ)(qb∧kbf ), for
some arbitrarily given θ ∈ (0, 1). It turns out that the first alternative always
dominates the second. A similar result can be obtained when we switch the
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fast and slow suppliers in the above arguments. Taken together, we reach the
conclusion of Proposition 4.4.1.
The above observations lead to some interesting insight—while diver-
sifying among independent suppliers leads to a cost saving, split orders among
positively correlated sources may dampen system performance. This result
shares a similar spirit with the well-known observation from the risk pooling
literature on the negative effect of pooling positively correlated demands. This
is because the variance of the pooled demand is higher than the sum of the
individual demand variances. In the second alternative mentioned above, in
contrast, when splitting the orders between two sources with perfect positive
correlation, the distribution of the total supply capacity remains unchanged.
Still, ordering from two sources underperforms ordering from one.
To see the intuition, suppose q∗f,t = 6 for some fixed I and qs,t(I). Then
by Ciarallo et al. (1994), q∗f,t = 6 is also the optimal order quantity when
the fast supply is unlimited and perfectly reliable. Now consider a random
capacity kf uniformly distributed over {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. We demonstrate
the delivery quantity for each realized capacity kf under different ordering
alternatives in Figure 4.1. The benchmark (the dots) is to order q∗f,t and obtain
q∗f,t ∧ kf . The squares and crosses correspond to different way of splitting q∗f,t
by (qa, qb) such that θqa + (1− θ)qb = q∗f,t. We first observe that in all cases,
the realized delivery quantity is no higher than the desired q∗f,t. Furthermore,
the benchmark case always has a higher realized delivery quantity, no matter
how we split q∗f,t between q
a and qb. Therefore, the benchmark case yields the
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minimum expected cost.
Notes. The capacity kf is uniformly distributed over {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. The first alterna-
tive (represented by the dots) orders q∗f = 6 from a source of capacity kf . The second alter-
native (represented by the squares or the crosses) orders qa and qb with θqa+(1−θ)qb = q∗f,t
and obtains θ(qa ∧ kf ) + (1− θ(qb ∧ kf ).
Figure 4.1: An example of the delivery quantity with respect to realized ca-
pacity level.
4.4.2 The Optimal Policy
The convexity of the optimal cost function established in the last section
allows us to further characterize the optimal policy. For ease of exposition,
we assume that the demand has a continuous density so that the optimal cost
function Vt(I) is differentiable. This is commonly assumed in the literature
(e.g., Fukuda 1964, Anupindi and Akella 1993, Ciarallo et al. 1994, Dada
et al. 2007). It is clear, though, from our subsequent analysis that our results
can be extended to the case of discrete demand.
When the suppliers are perfectly reliable (Fukuda 1964, Yazlali and
Erhun 2009) or when there is only one supplier with random capacity (Ciarallo
97
et al. 1994), the optimal policy is known to be a base-stock type. However,
when purchasing from two sources with random capacities, a base-stock policy
is generally suboptimal, as indicated in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.4.2. Under the optimal ordering policy, the following relations
hold for a small enough positive δ.
0 ≤ q∗f,t(I − δ)− q∗f,t(I) ≤ δ for ∀I, (4.3)
0 ≤ q∗s,t(I − δ)− q∗s,t(I) ≤ δ for ∀I, (4.4)
[q∗f,t(I − δ) + q∗s,t(I − δ)]− [q∗f,t(I) + q∗s,t(I)] ≥ δ
for I ≤ max{If,t, Is,t}. (4.5)
When the inventory level decreases, the fast and slow orders should
increase. This suggests that there exists a reorder point Ij, j = s, f , such that
a positive order q∗j,t(I) is issued if and only if I is below Ij. When the suppliers
are both reliable (Fukuda 1964), Ij becomes the base-stock level (see the left
panel of Figure 4.2). In this case, for I ≤ max{If , Is}, a unit reduction in
inventory implies exactly one unit increase in one of the procurement orders.
Similarly, when only one supplier with random capacity kj is involved (Ciarallo
et al. 1994), a unit reduction in inventory is always compensated by a unit
increase in q∗j (I) for I ≤ Ij. In the general case of two suppliers with random
capacities, though, each procurement order compensates a unit decrease in
inventory by an amount no more than one unit, as stated in Proposition 4.4.2
and demonstrated in the right panel of Figure 4.2. Furthermore, the total order
quantity increases by at least one unit, indicating a tendency to mitigate the
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delivery uncertainty. In other words, the optimal policy not only splits the bet
between the two suppliers to share the risk, but also increases the total bet to
ensure a certain post-delivery stock level.
Parameters: T = 10, α = 0.95, cf = 9, cS = 10, h = 2, p = 21, and D ∼
Normal(30, 6). The left panel (limited deterministic supplies) assumes kf = 20 and
ks = 19. The right panel (unlimited random supplies) assumes kf , ks ∈ {0,∞}
with Pr{kf = 0} = 0.15 and Pr{ks = 0} = 0.2.
Figure 4.2: The optimal ordering quantities as functions of the inventory level.
In general, the optimal reorder point for the fast supplier can be higher
or lower than that for the slow supplier, depending on the cost structure. This
is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.4.3. The following relations hold for the reorder points
i) If cs > h+ cf , then Is,t ≤ If,t.
ii) If cf > cs + p, then If,t ≤ Is,t.
The condition cs > h+ cf indicates that buying one unit from the slow
supplier is more expensive than buying one unit from the fast supplier and
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carrying that unit for one period. In this case, the reorder point for the slow
supplier is always lower than that of the fast supplier. In other words, it is
suboptimal to order exclusively from the slow supplier, as Proposition 4.4.3 i)
suggests.
When cf > cs + p, buying one unit from the fast supplier is more
expensive than backordering that unit for one period and procuring it from the
slow supplier. In this case, the reorder point for the fast supplier is lower than
that of the slow. Thus, the optimal policy never calls for ordering exclusively
from the fast supplier, as stated in Proposition 4.4.3 ii).
Proposition 4.4.3 generalizes an earlier result derived for the special
case of unlimited and reliable supplies (Fukuda 1964), i.e., kf = ks =∞. The
condition in i) implies cs ≥ cf , under which it is obviously suboptimal to ever
order from the slow supplier in this special case. If, however, cs < αcf , then
it is known that the reorder point for the slow supplier is always above that
of the fast supplier. In other words, with enough inventory for the current
period, there is no need to order from the expensive fast supplier. Yet, the
low-cost slow supplier can be used to build up inventory for the subsequent
periods.
4.4.3 The Possibility of Ordering Exclusively from an Inferior Sup-
plier
An important feature of the model with kf = ks =∞ is that a supplier
with inferior characteristics in both leadtime and cost should be completely
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excluded. A similar conclusion has been reached in analyzing the models with
multiple unreliable suppliers. Assuming that every supplier has one-period
leadtime, it is never optimal to order exclusively from a supplier who has a
higher cost and a lower reliability than others (see, e.g., Dada et al. 2007,
Swaminathan and Shanthikumar 1999). All of these observations suggest that
if only one supplier order is issued, then that supplier must be superior in some
way. The question is: Does this notion hold in general?
Interestingly, the answer is no. It can be optimal to order exclusively
from a supplier who has a higher cost, longer leadtime and lower reliability than
the other supplier. This can be a consequence of two factors as demonstrated
by the two examples in Figure 4.2.
The first factor is the capacity limitation of the fast supplier. The ex-
ample in the left panel assumes reliable supplies with deterministic capacities.
We observe that only a slow order is issued for I ∈ [38.2, 50.7], even though
the slow supplier is more expensive. This is because the on-hand inventory
is high enough to avoid a fast order in the current period. However, because
of the limited fast supply, ordering some units from the slow supplier can
help to avoid shortage in the future periods. In this case, it is optimal to
order exclusively from the slow supplier who has a longer leadtime and higher
procurement cost than the fast supplier.
The second factor that may lead to a similar observation is uncertainty
associated with the fast supplier. The example in the right panel of Figure 4.2
assumes unlimited random supplies. For I ∈ [39.1, 60.6], it is optimal to source
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only from the slow supplier who is more expensive and less reliable than the fast
one. This is a consequence of the supply unreliability, which can be mitigated
by splitting the bet between the fast and slow suppliers. Specifically, the slow
order issued in the current period shares the risk with the fast order in the
next period to meet the demand in that period.
To sum up, the optimal policy may call for ordering exclusively from
an inferior supplier to alleviate capacity limitation and to share supply risk.
These observations highlight the importance of incorporating cost, leadtime
and reliability in a unified framework to evaluate supplier selection strategies.
4.5 Order Allocation between the Suppliers: A Numer-
ical Analysis
Applying the optimal policy derived in the previous section, we further
examine how the firm allocates the orders between the fast and slow suppliers
via a numerical study. The previous studies on multiple sourcing mainly focus
on deriving the optimal ordering policy. The long-term order allocation among
suppliers has been mentioned in only a few studies. Yazlali and Erhun (2009)
analyze a version of our model with deterministic upper and lower order limits.
Federgruen and Yang (2009) suggest an allocation rule according to shortfall
probability in their one-period model of multiple suppliers with random yields
and one-period leadtimes. Allon and Van Mieghem (2010) derive a formula
governing strategic allocation between an expensive nearshore source and a
cheaper offshore source under a tailored base-surge policy. Our subsequent
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analysis of long-term order allocation, in contrast, combines the main supply
characteristics including cost, capacity, reliability, and leadtime, which leads
to new insights.
For the base case, we consider a planning horizon of T = 50 with a
discount factor of α = 0.95 and an initial inventory of I1 = 0. The firm pays
cf = cs = 3 for each unit obtained from the fast or the slow supplier. The
inventory cost function is given by H(x) = hx+ + px− with h = 2 and p = 12.
The demand follows a truncated normal distribution with mean µD = 30 and
σD = 9.
In our subsequent analysis, we focus on the order allocation between
the suppliers. Let q̄f =
∑T
t=1 Eq∗f,t(It)/T and q̄s =
∑T−1
t=1 Eq∗s,t(It)/(T − 1) be
the average order per period from the fast and slow suppliers, respectively. For
ease of exposition, we simply term q̄f and q̄s as the per-period fast and slow
orders, respectively, with the understanding that they are expectations over
all the sample paths of the optimal orders from period 1 to T . We compute




× 100% and λs = q̄s
q̄f + q̄s
× 100%.
Because capacity is an important factor in our model, we first examine
its effect on λf and λs. In the left panel of Figure 4.3, we assume that the
suppliers have the same deterministic capacity k. With scarce supply, i.e.,
k < 13, the capacities of both suppliers are exhausted, leading to a 50–50 split
between them, i.e., λf = λs = 50%. For intermediate capacity levels, i.e.,
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k ∈ [13, 26], the slow supplier obtains an increased allocation as k increases.
This is because the fast order, though being reactive, would not meet the
demand alone. Given this restriction, it is inevitable to rely on an advance
slow order in order to hedge against the stockout risk, which costs much more
than the overstock risk as p is higher than h. Consequently, the allocation to
the slow supplier λs is above 50% in this range of k. However, the situation
is reversed when there is an ample fast supply capacity. Now the need for a
slow order is much reduced because the fast order can quickly bring the stock
to the desired level. In the extreme case when k > 50, the share of the slow
order λs becomes negligible.
The right panel of Figure 4.3 depicts three examples of random supply.
Specifically, each supplier has a capacity of k with probability β and zero with
probability 1 − β, where β ∈ {0.5, 0.7, 0.95}. To our surprise, the allocation
to the fast order λf decreases in the maximum capacity k, while that of the
slow order λs increases. For example, when β = 0.7, in the extreme case where
k → ∞, λf = 28% and λs = 72%. Even with a high probability of delivery
(β = 0.95), λf is only 40 % when k →∞. Why should the firm heavily rely on
the slow supplier who is less responsive than the fast supplier, yet has the same
cost and capacity as the latter? The reason is twofold. First, because of supply
uncertainties, it is beneficial to split the order between the two suppliers to
share the delivery risk. Second, when determining the fast order for a given
period, the delivery quantity from the advance slow order is already observed.
A large fast order is only needed if there is no delivery from the slow order.
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As a result, the fast order is only used as a supplement for the slow order,
thereby leading to a small λf and a large λs.
Parameters: T = 50, α = 0.95, cf = 3, cs = 3, h = 2, p = 12, and D ∼
Normal(30, 9). The left panel assumes limited deterministic supplies. The right
panel assumes limited random supplies with kj ∈ {0, k} where Pr{kj = k} = β,
j = f, s.
Figure 4.3: The percentage shares of the fast and slow suppliers with respect
to the maximum capacity limit.
From Figure 4.3, we observe that the effects of supply limit and supply
uncertainty on order allocation can be very different. In order to isolate these
effects, we analyze the following capacity configurations.
• Limited deterministic supply. In this case, the capacity of either supplier
is k = 35.
• Unlimited random supply. In this case, the capacity of either supplier
is either infinity or zero with probabilities β = 0.7 or 1 − β = 0.3,
respectively. Thus, the average capacity is infinite.
• Limited random supply. In this case, the capacity of either supplier is
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either k = 35 or zero with probabilities β = 0.7 or 1 − β = 0.3, respec-
tively. We shall note that the qualitative insights do not change when
we apply other distributions with finite mean, e.g., normal, uniform, etc.
Next we examine the optimal order allocation with respect to model inputs.
4.5.1 Effect of Planning Horizon
It is worth noting from Table 4.1 that q̄f + q̄s is decreasing in the
planning horizon T in all scenarios. In other words, on average, more units
are ordered when it is closer to the end of the horizon. This makes an in-
teresting contrast to a well-known result for replenishment systems following
(modified) base-stock policies (e.g., Heyman and Sobel 1984, Federgruen and
Zipkin 1986). In particular, a lower base-stock level is maintained for a later
period because a unit ordered earlier has a better chance to be sold. The
difference between their observations and ours lies in the fact that our model
considers two suppliers, as opposed to a single supplier. To understand the
intuition, we examine the examples in Table 4.1.
An early slow order has an advantage of hedging the stockout risks
induced by the capacity restriction on the late fast order, but has a disadvan-
tage of increasing the risk of overstock. When there are more periods to go,
overstock is less of a concern given the many opportunities to sell the units
before the end of the horizon. This leads to an increased per-period slow order
q̄s as demonstrated in Table 4.1. With a large q̄s, the available stock at the
beginning of a period is likely to meet the demand in that period, reducing the
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Table 4.1: The effect of planning horizon on order allocation
Limited Deterministic Unlimited Random Limited Random
Capacity Capacity Capacity
q̄f q̄s q̄f + q̄s λ
f q̄f q̄s β(q̄f + q̄s) λ
f q̄f q̄s β(q̄f + q̄s) λ
f
T = 5 24.72 7.30 32.02 77.20 % 18.61 30.71 34.52 37.73 % 19.28 29.12 33.88 39.83 %
10 23.40 7.66 31.06 75.34 % 15.09 31.03 32.28 32.72 % 16.21 29.57 32.04 35.40 %
30 22.59 7.77 30.36 74.41 % 12.76 31.19 30.76 29.03 % 13.89 29.96 30.69 31.68 %
50 22.43 7.79 30.21 74.23 % 12.29 31.22 30.46 28.25 % 13.42 30.03 30.42 30.88 %
100 22.30 7.80 30.11 74.09 % 11.94 31.24 30.23 27.65 % 13.06 30.09 30.21 30.27 %
need for a large reactive fast order. Consequently, the per-period fast order q̄f
decreases in the length of the planning horizon.
Furthermore, placing a slow order not only reduces the need for a fast
order in the next period, but also decreases the fast order quantity in the cur-
rent period. This is because possible stockouts at the end of the current period
may be covered by the incoming slow order in the next period. Therefore, the
increase in the per-period slow order is less than the decrease in the per-period
fast order, resulting in a reduced total per-period order q̄f + q̄s. Under deter-
ministic capacities, the total per-period order becomes closer to the average
demand µD = 30 as the planning horizon extends. This suggests that by re-
lying more on the slow supplier, the system can achieve a near perfect match
between supply and demand in the long term. With random supplies, the per-
period total order q̄f + q̄s is generally higher than that under deterministic
capacities due to the possibility of no delivery. The expected per-period order
quantity β(q̄f + q̄s), however, also approaches to µD as the planning horizon
becomes longer.
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From the upper panel of Table 4.2, we observe that as the fast order
becomes more expensive, its share in the total order, λf , is reduced in all cases.
This is intuitive and consistent with the observations from Yazlali and Erhun
(2009).
Table 4.2: The effect of procurement and penalty costs on order allocation.
Limited Deterministic Unlimited Random Limited Random
Capacity Capacity Capacity
q̄f q̄s λ
f q̄f q̄s λ
f q̄f q̄s λ
f
cf = 1 29.32 0.81 97.30 % 25.63 17.60 59.28 % 21.86 21.43 50.50 %
2 28.82 1.29 95.72 % 16.63 26.79 38.29 % 16.53 26.86 38.10 %
3 22.43 7.79 74.23 % 12.29 31.22 28.25 % 13.42 30.03 30.88 %
4 4.66 25.93 15.23 % 9.88 33.69 22.67 % 12.11 31.37 27.86 %
5 2.44 28.20 7.95 % 8.43 35.16 19.34 % 11.45 32.04 26.33 %
p = 12 22.43 7.79 74.23 % 12.29 31.22 28.25 % 13.42 30.03 30.88 %
16 22.15 8.11 73.19 % 11.77 31.83 27.00 % 13.55 29.97 31.14 %
20 21.61 8.69 71.32 % 11.54 32.12 26.43 % 13.79 29.79 31.63 %
24 21.51 8.81 70.94 % 11.48 32.22 26.27 % 14.00 29.62 32.10 %
28 21.24 9.11 69.98 % 11.56 32.18 26.43 % 14.15 29.50 32.43 %
The lower panel of Table 4.2 demonstrates the effect of increasing short-
age cost p on order allocation (that of decreasing h is similar). A common
observation is that q̄f + q̄s is increasing in p. This is consistent with our intu-
ition that large orders should be placed when stockout is costly. Interestingly,
though, the individual per-period orders q̄f and q̄s may increase or decrease in
different scenarios.
In the example of deterministic capacity, the per-period fast order q̄f
decreases and the per-period slow order q̄s increases as p increases. This is
simply because as shortage becomes more expensive, the optimal policy tends
to prepare for stockouts via placing a slow order in advance.
Under unlimited random capacity, a similar observation is obtained for
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small enough p. However, as p becomes very large, the optimal policy tends
to increase the allocation to the fast supplier and decrease that to the slow
supplier. To see the intuition, we note that holding inventory is now much
cheaper than backordering demand. It becomes economical to order early and
hold inventory in preparation for future demands in view of the uncertainties
associated with both fast and slow suppliers. Therefore, the optimal policy
tends to place a large fast order that not only aims at meeting the demand in
the current period but also attempts to share the risk of orders to be delivered
in future periods. Such an effect becomes stronger under limited and random
capacity.
4.5.2 Effect of Demand Uncertainty
Intuitively, as the demand variability increases, the fast order becomes
increasingly useful, because it is more responsive than the slow order in ad-
justing the inventory level based on demand realizations. This is in line with
the observations by Allon and Van Mieghem (2010) and Yazlali and Erhun
(2009). It is also the case in our model with unlimited and random supply, as
shown in Table 4.3.
A contrasting observation is obtained under limited deterministic supply—
an increased standard deviation of the demand σD leads to a reduced share of
the fast order, λf . In particular, when the demand is nearly deterministic, i.e.,
σD = 1, the fast supply is enough to meet the demand since k = 35 > 30 = µD.
As demand gets more volatile, however, a slow order may be necessary in the
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event of a large demand realization, resulting in a reduced λf .
Table 4.3: The effect of demand uncertainty on order allocation.
Limited Deterministic Unlimited Random Limited Random
Capacity Capacity Capacity
q̄f q̄s λ
f q̄f q̄s λ
f q̄f q̄s λ
f
σD = 1 30.01 0.00 100.00 % 9.59 33.87 22.06 % 13.74 29.58 31.72 %
3 29.99 0.03 99.91 % 10.22 33.25 23.51 % 12.73 30.65 29.34 %
5 27.93 2.14 92.87 % 10.87 32.62 25.00 % 12.71 30.70 29.28 %
7 25.13 5.01 83.37 % 11.56 31.94 26.58 % 13.04 30.40 30.02 %
9 22.43 7.79 74.23 % 12.29 31.22 28.25 % 13.42 30.03 30.88 %
Under limited and random capacity, the optimal policy reveals a mixed
pattern as suggested from Table 4.3. A high demand variability implies an
increased chance of large demand realizations, which in turn induces the need
for larger orders. Because capacities are limited and random, the fast and
slow orders play different roles in mitigating the demand uncertainty. On the
one hand, being placed in advance, one can put a large bet on the slow order.
Even if it is not delivered, there is still a chance to replenish by ordering
from the fast supplier. On the other hand, with a shorter leadtime, the fast
order is more reactive to immediate stockouts induced by demand uncertainty.
Taken together, the allocation between the fast and slow orders is generally
not monotone with respect to the variance of the demand.
4.5.3 Effect of Leadtime
As mentioned earlier in §4.2, there has not been any discussion in the
literature on problems involving random supplies with general leadtimes due
to the analytical difficulty. Nevertheless, we attempt to extend our under-
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standing of the leadtime effect by considering the case when the fast supplier
has an L-period leadtime and the slow one has an L+ 1-period leadtime. We
shall also assume that the capacities are observed one period after placing
the corresponding orders. Under this assumption, the results derived in §4.4
continue to hold for general L > 0 (see Remark C.0.1 in Appendix).
Table 4.4: The effect of leadtime on order allocation
Limited Deterministic Unlimited Random Limited Random
Capacity Capacity Capacity
q̄f q̄s λ
f q̄f q̄s λ
f q̄f q̄s λ
f
L = 1 22.43 7.79 74.23 % 12.29 31.22 28.25 % 13.42 30.03 30.88 %
2 25.84 34.93 42.52 % 22.70 64.29 26.10 % 35.00 35.00 50.00 %
3 35.00 35.00 50.00 % 32.79 97.68 25.13 % 35.00 35.00 50.00 %
4 35.00 35.00 50.00 % 42.87 131.06 24.65 % 35.00 35.00 50.00 %
5 35.00 35.00 50.00 % 52.71 164.68 24.25 % 35.00 35.00 50.00 %
Table 4.4 demonstrates that a higher leadtime L leads to a reduced
share of the fast order λf when the supply is unlimited and random. This is be-
cause the one-period leadtime advantage of the fast supplier loses significance
when both suppliers have longer leadtimes. A similar effect is also observed
under limited deterministic capacities, however only temporarily. Specifically,
when the leadtimes increase, the share of the fast order first decreases and
then quickly recovers. This increase in λf is due to capacity exhaustion. Be-
cause increased leadtimes imply higher exposure to demand variability, the
desired level of safety stock increases. When the supply capacities are limited,
this eventually induces the need to have both suppliers fully utilized. Con-
sequently, the share of the fast supplier λf goes up to obtain a 50–50 split
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between the two suppliers. This split is more quickly reached when suppliers
have limited and random capacities as seen in Table 4.4.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we attempt to understand the joint effect of cost, relia-
bility and delivery leadtime on a firm’s multiple sourcing strategy. Analyzing
these key dimensions of supplier characteristics in a unified framework leads
to some interesting observations. First, we show that it may be optimal to
order exclusively from a supplier who is inferior in all of the three dimensions.
This is driven by capacity limitation or uncertainty associated with the fast
supplier. In particular, when the on-hand inventory level is high enough to
meet the demand in the current period, a fast order is not needed. However
the stockout risk in the next period remains an issue due to the limited or un-
certain capacity of the fast supplier. A slow order placed in the current period
can effectively mitigate this risk even if it is more expensive and unreliable
than the fast. Thus, the firm may source only from an inferior slow supplier
when the on-hand inventory is high enough. Second, we observe that an infe-
rior supplier may actually be the primary source of procurement. Due to its
unique risk mitigation benefit, when the supply capacity is very restrictive or
highly uncertain, firms should order primarily from the slow supplier even if
it does not outperform the fast in cost or reliability. These observations high-
light the important role the slow supplier plays when sourcing from multiple
unreliable suppliers.
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To conclude, we discuss the limitations of the model and point out
possible avenues for future research. Our model has assumed one-period delay
in observing supply capacities. In reality, this observation may be obtained
any time from ordering to delivery, i.e., with an m-period delay for 1 ≤ m ≤ L.
For a general m, the problem becomes more complex due to extended state
space. However, we believe that the major insights should carry through,
because the advantage of an early slow order in mitigating future stockouts is
preserved. An interesting issue to explore is how supply visibility, measured in
terms of m, impacts the allocation between the fast and slow suppliers. As in
many earlier studies, we have refined our discussion to consecutive leadtimes.
A more realistic model should allow for an arbitrary leadtime difference. This
again imposes an analytical difficulty and one has to identify efficient heuristic
policies. Intuitively, a smaller quantity should be allocated to a slow supplier
that has a significantly longer leadtime. If such a notion can be validated, then
an important research question is how large the leadtime difference should be





This dissertation explores strategies to mitigate the risks associated
with operational and strategic decisions of a firm, particularly focusing on
project management, platform development and procurement decisions. In the
first essay, we develop methods to evaluate risky capital investment projects
that involve managerial flexibility and we illustrate these methods with an al-
ternative energy investment project. In the second essay, we build a strategic
model to understand the role of product development decisions as a means to
capture demand in two-sided markets. Finally, in the third essay we investi-
gate the value of integrating leadtime flexibility and supply diversification to
mitigate supply and demand risks. Our results demonstrate the importance
of an integrated approach to risk management.
In the first essay we develop two simulation-based methods to evaluate
capital investment projects that involve managerial flexibility. We propose us-
ing system dynamics simulations to model the project uncertainty in order to
increase the realism of the project model. The methods we develop are based
upon first formulating a system dynamics model of the project and then trans-
forming the cash flow data obtained from the model into a decision tree. The
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SD-based decision tree approach employs the bracket median approximation
technique for this transformation and then evaluates the decision tree using
a risk-adjusted discount rate. This is a naive approach to valuation since the
same risk-adjusted discount rate is used for the project with and without op-
tions regardless of the changing risk character. The diffusion approximation
approach overcomes this issue by approximating the cash flow uncertainty gen-
erated by the system dynamics model with a binomial decision tree and then
evaluating the tree using risk-neutral valuation.
In the literature, it has been argued that there has existed a fundamen-
tal trade-off between “detail complexity” and “dynamic complexity”: Finan-
cial theory has tended to sacrifice detail complexity, the fidelity of a model at
a detailed level, whereas decision analysis has often focused on detail complex-
ity at the expense of keeping some model dynamics unrealistically simple, for
example by using a single risk-adjusted discount rate (Smith 1999). In this es-
say, we show that by using a system dynamics model as an input to evaluating
managerial flexibility, it is possible to improve this trade-off between dynamic
and detail complexity.
In the second essay, we examine the development of product platforms
in markets that exhibit strong cross-network externalities. In many cases,
manufacturers of product platforms in these two-sided markets face a trade-off
between developing a high performance platform that matches the end-user’s
preferences and sacrificing some of those preferences in exchange for improved
or less costly third party development capabilities. We use a strategic model to
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gain intuition about how to make such trade-off decisions under competition
and show that conventional wisdom about product development decisions may
be misleading in the presence of strong cross-network externalities.
We first characterize content-driven and performance driven markets.
The main difference between the two is that end-users highly value content
availability in the former and platform performance in the latter. Moreover, in
performance-driven markets the platforms are differentiated enough to appeal
to different segments of end-users alleviating the intensity of competition. Our
results suggest that conventional wisdom may be especially misleading in a
content-driven market. For instance, one would expect to see more aggressive
investment in product performance if the intensity of competition goes up.
However, it turns out in a content-driven market a better strategy for platform
providers is to decrease the investment in platform performance and to provide
greater content availability instead. More importantly, we show that contrary
to the conventional wisdom about “winner-take-all” markets, heavily investing
in the core performance of a platform does not always yield a competitive edge
when there are strong cross-network effects. In particular, offering a platform
with lower performance but greater availability of content may be a better
strategy in a content-driven market if platforms are price takers.
The analysis in the second essay focuses on static games of competi-
tion between platforms. An interesting direction for future research would be
analyzing performance investment strategies of an incumbent and an entrant
in a dynamic framework to better understand the extent of installed base ad-
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vantage. Also, throughout the analysis we assume that content developers can
produce content for multiple platforms as long as there is profit to be made,
however this does not hold for industries where exclusivity deals bind the
content developers to a single platform. If end-users and content developers
cannot be affiliated with more than one platform, network effects would have
a stronger impact on the market outcome. Our preliminary analysis on this
framework shows that the main results for the performance investment strat-
egy continue to hold qualitatively. However, a detailed comparison between
the two frameworks is left as future research.
In the third essay, we explore the joint effect of cost, reliability and
delivery leadtime on a firm’s multiple-sourcing strategy. Specifically, we study
dual-sourcing from unreliable suppliers with consecutive delivery leadtimes.
We first establish that base-stock policy is generally suboptimal for this pro-
curement problem. Instead, the optimal ordering policy is a threshold policy
meaning that there exist reorder points for each supplier such that a positive
order is issued if and only if the net inventory level is below the reorder point.
We also show that in compensating one unit reduction in net inventory, the
total ordering quantity increases by at least one unit, indicating a tendency
to mitigate the delivery uncertainty. In other words, diversifying the sourcing
profile not only allows for splitting the bet between the two suppliers to share
the risk, but also increases the total bet to ensure a certain post-delivery stock
level.
Previous results in the dual sourcing and supply diversification litera-
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tures suggest that if only one supplier order is issued, then that supplier must
be superior in at least one of the dimensions, cost, leadtime or reliability. In-
terestingly, in our model it can be optimal to order exclusively from a supplier
who has a higher cost, longer leadtime and lower reliability than the other.
This can be a consequence of two factors. The first factor is the capacity
limitation of the fast supplier. When the on-hand inventory is high enough to
avoid a fast order in the current period, the firm may be better off ordering
some units from a more expensive slow supplier to hedge against the stockout
risk in the future periods. The second factor is the unreliability of the fast
supply, which can be mitigated by splitting the bet between the fast and the
slow suppliers. Specifically, the slow order issued in the current period shares
the risk with the fast order in the next period to meet the demand in that
period.
We further examine how the firm should allocate the total order be-
tween the fast and slow suppliers, who we assume are identical except for their
leadtimes. Our analysis suggests that when the fast supplier has ample and
reliable capacity, the slow supplier is mainly used as a backup. However, the
situation is reversed if the fast supplier’s capacity is restrictive or uncertain.
In particular, the firm uses the slow supplier as the primary source of procure-
ment even if the slow supplier does not offer any cost or reliability advantage.
These observations highlight the importance of incorporating cost, leadtime
and reliability in a unified framework to evaluate supplier selection strategies.
Our model has a few simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that
118
there is a one-period delay in observing supply capacities. In reality, capacity
uncertainty may resolve any time from ordering to delivery. Allowing for a
more general structure of supply visibility would extend the state space and
make the problem more complex. However, we believe that the main insights
should carry through, as the unique risk sharing benefit of the slow supplier
is preserved. Nonetheless, exploring the effects of supply visibility would be
an interesting avenue for future research. Second, as in many earlier studies,
we assumed a one-period leadtime difference between the two suppliers. An
arbitrary leadtime difference would be more realistic, albeit difficult to analyze.
One would expect that the allocation to the slow supplier would be reduced
if its leadtime is significantly longer. An interesting research question is to
explore how large a leadtime difference still preserves the slow supplier’s role
as a primary source of procurement.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the existing operations man-
agement literature in two ways. First, it illustrates the role of effective risk
mitigation through integrating the operational strategies of leadtime flexibility
and supply diversification as well as through recognizing managerial flexibil-
ity. Second, it highlights the importance of leveraging third-party content
development while making technology investment decisions for platforms in
two-sided markets. Integrating risk management and operational decisions
and the application of this framework to two-sided markets are both promis-
ing research directions. We strongly believe that our findings and analyses can
be extended to develop new managerial insights for many other issues affecting
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today’s businesses.
This dissertation encompasses a variety of topics in the area of oper-
ations management. Exploring these different areas of research has been a
motivating experience; however, it also proved to be challenging. The chal-
lenge mainly lies in the fact that each area requires mastering a specialized set
of tools and techniques. As a result, getting enough exposure to the fundamen-
tals of a domain can be quite demanding. Drawing analogies from operations
and risk management, one can recognize the following research diversification
trade-off. A very narrow research focus may lead to a difficulty in generating
new ideas, which is a risk that can be mitigated by a diversified portfolio of
research interests. Yet, a too-diversified researcher cannot effectively take ad-
vantage of “economies of scale” in research productivity. One lesson I have
learned during the process of writing this dissertation is that for a novice re-
searcher, the latter is likely to be a bigger risk. Thus, for my future studies I
am planning to narrow down my research interests. Specifically, my primary
focus will be studying two-sided markets from the perspective of operations
and risk management.
An operations management perspective can contribute considerably to
the study of two-sided markets. The presence of cross-network effects often
requires different strategies for two-sided markets than those developed for
traditional products and services. The growing literature in this area, how-
ever, has been mostly confined to two-sided pricing strategies. Thus, there is
more work to be done to improve our understanding of product development,
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procurement or supply chain design in a two-sided market. The second essay
in this dissertation is an attempt in this direction.
In particular, the primary focus of my future research agenda is risk
mitigation in two-sided markets. Mainly because it is an emergent field, the
study of two-sided markets has been limited to a deterministic framework
for the most part. However, an operations management perspective to two-
sided markets would be incomplete without recognizing the need to mitigate
operational risks. For instance, as highlighted in my third essay, supplier
selection and procurement decisions are profoundly affected by the need to
mitigate demand and supply risks. It is an open question, though, how such
decisions should be made in a two-sided market.
In terms of application areas, a particularly appealing domain is the
Smart Grids. The Smart Grid of the future is likely to provide consumers with
access to many applications designed to better manage electricity consump-
tion. These applications may have implications similar to the role “apps” play
for smartphones. Thus, the two-sided market perspective may be useful in un-
derstanding how Smart Grids should be managed to get both the application
developers and the consumers on board. Naturally, this is only one facet of
the problem. Managing a Smart Grid involves an exceptionally difficult task
of matching supply and demand, for which the best practices of operations
and risk management are needed. In addition to my training in operations
management, the background I acquired while building the alternative energy
technologies investment model for the first essay will provide a foundation for
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my interests in this domain.
The share of two-sided markets in the global economy is rapidly grow-
ing. Some of the most important industries are based on this business model,
including video-game platforms, credit cards, cell phones, auction sites and op-
erating systems. This provides further basis for research efforts to improve our






Evaluating System Dynamics Models of Risky
Projects Using Decision Trees and Real
Options Theory
A.1 Fossil Fuel (Natural Gas) Model
The fossil fuel model is developed to obtain a plausible causal model
of the fossil fuel price, which is the major uncertainty the alternative energy
technologies (AETs) face. We used natural gas data to calibrate the model,
since it is mainly the natural gas price that determines the electricity price
and thus the profitability of AETs. Therefore, we will describe the model as
a natural gas model even though one can safely read it as a generic model for
fossil fuels.
A.1.1 Reserves Sector
The total quantity of fossil fuel is divided into three stocks: undiscov-
ered resources, identified reserves and cumulative production. Exploration ac-
tivities result in discovery of fossil fuel, which depletes Undiscovered Resources
and fills in the Identified Reserves. As natural gas is produced, Identified Re-
serves are depleted. Yet, only a fraction of reserves in the Identified Reserves
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is technically recoverable (TechRC ).
TechRC = Identified Reserves ∗ fraction recoverable (A.1)
Fraction recoverable can be increased with investment in production technol-
ogy as will be discussed in Section A.1.7.
Potential production rate is constrained by the technically recoverable
reserves and production capacity. Moreover, it is assumed that the industry
has a desired level of “reserves to production ratio” (R/P ratio), which rep-
resents how many years’ worth of fossil fuel will be kept in “inventory”. One
such reasonable level is keeping approximately 10 years’ worth of reserves in
inventory. Hence, production rate is constrained not only with technically re-
coverable reserves and production capacity but also the desired level of R/P
ratio. Finally, production yield is stochastic: It might be lower than the
intended level but cannot be higher, as the upper limit is constrained by tech-
nically recoverable reserves and the desired R/P ratio. This stochasticity is
modeled via a multiplicative effect formulation Production Disruptions. Pro-
duction Disruptions is a combination of ordinary disruptions, (minor random
jumps in the supply) and supply shock, a major disruption that tracks the
major oil crisis back in 1970s.
Potential Production Rate = (A.2)
min{ TechRC
Desired R/P Ratio
∗ production disruptions, Production Capacity}
125
Production rate is the minimum of the Potential Production Rate and the
Production Demand.
ProductionRate = min{PotentialProduction, ProductionDemand} (A.3)
A.1.2 Exploration Sector
Just like the production sector, only a fraction of potential resources
in the UndiscoveredResources is technically discoverable (TechDS ) with the
current technology. Fraction discoverable (frDis) can be increased with in-
vestment in exploration technology.
TechnDS = UndiscoveredResources ∗ frDis (A.4)
As existing resources diminish, it becomes more expensive to discover new
fields. Hence, the productivity of investment in exploration diminishes. The
productivity is assumed not to fall below a certain level; hence, the effect of
diminishing resources does not exceed a certain threshold, MaxEffect. To avoid
division by zero error in the extreme case scenarios, the effect is formulated
as:
effect of availability (A.5)
= min{IFTHENELSE(RR < 1e− 009,MaxEffect, RR−0.9),
MaxEffect}
where
RR = IFTHENELSE(TechDS ∗ InitialDiscovered > 0,
T echDS/InitialDiscovered, 0) (A.6)
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Hence, the unit exploration cost (UEC ) is:
UEC = Initial UEC ∗ effect of availability (A.7)
Exploration activities take time. Each time unit, only a fraction of the in-
vestment’s potential discovery rate is revealed. To account for this, we model
Investment in Exploration (InvE) as a stock that fills with new investment in
exploration and drains when a discovery is actualized.
actualized investment = Total InvE/discovery time (A.8)
With the Unit Exploration Cost (UEC), this actualized investment rate results
in a discovery rate as follows:
Discovery Rate = actualized investment/UEC (A.9)
A.1.3 Demand Sector
Production demand has two determinants: Base demand rate and gas
price. Base demand rate (BaseDR) grows continuously due to population
increase that surpasses any possible decrease in energy intensity.
growthBaseD = BaseDR ∗DemandGrowthRatio (A.10)
Yet, increasing price has a negative effect on demand, even though in the short
run fossil fuel demand is highly inelastic. The effect of price on demand has
two components: Short Term Effect of Price on Demand (STeff) and Effect of
Conservation (EffCon). The former is based on the ratio of the spot price to
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the expected value of gas price. The expected value is updated when a trend
in gas price becomes permanent.
change in exp. gas price =
(Gas Price− Average Gas Price)/adjustment time (A.11)
Further,
GasPriceRatio = Gas Price/Expected Gas Price (A.12)
STeff = Gas price ratio−elasticity (A.13)
Effect of conservation on demand (EffCon) is observed after a delay.
EffCon = DELAY 3(GasPriceRatioC , conservation time) (A.14)
Moreover, if the gas price goes beyond a certain price threshold, it will be
substituted by other energy resources, which is modeled by Effect of Switching
to Alternative Resources (EffSwitch). It is a delayed effect of price ratio, the
ratio of Gas Price to the price threshold.
EffSwitch = f(DELAY 3(price ratio, switching time)) (A.15)
where f is described by Figure A.1. Hence, the Indicated Production Demand
(InProdDem) is computed as:
InProdDem = BaseDR ∗ STeff ∗ EffCon ∗ EffSwitch (A.16)






Figure A.1: Graphical Function for the Effect of Switching to Alternative
Resources
A.1.4 Gas Price Sector
Three major factors determine the gas price: Demand, supply and
total unit production cost, which includes exploration and production costs.
The price level that would be obtained when supply and demand is perfectly
balanced is called Unrestricted Gas Price. This price level is a function of
Unit Production Cost (UPC) and Unit Exploration Cost (UEC). It is assumed
that there is a desired margin the industry would like to achieve. This level
determines the Unrestricted Gas Price together with the total unit cost.
Unrestricted Gas Pr. = Total Unit Cost ∗ (1 + desired margin) (A.18)
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When demand for natural gas is higher than its supply, the gas price increases.
The effect of demand supply balance on gas price is modeled as follows:






Hence, gas price is determined as:
Gas Price = Unrestricted Gas Pr. ∗Demand Supply Eff (A.21)
A.1.5 Production Sector
Production Capacity can be thought of as the refinery capacity. It
increases with new production capacity acquisitions and decreases with depre-
ciation. Total Investment in Capacity increases with new capacity investment
(in $) and capacity is acquired after a delay, capacity building time. In a
way, Actualized Capacity Investment (ActCapInv) measures how much capac-
ity would be built now with the Total Investment in Capacity (TotCapInv) if
the capacity cost were 1.
ActCapInv = TotCapInv/capacity building time (A.22)
The actual Production Capacity Acquisition (ProdCapAcq) is:
ProdCapAcq = ActCapInv/Production Capacity Cost (A.23)
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Unit Production Cost (UPC) is a function of remaining resources and remain-
ing reserves.
EffRemRes = min{a1, ( TechDS
InitialUndiscovered
)−0.5} (A.24)
The effect of remaining reserves (EffRemRez ) is analogous. Hence Unit Pro-
duction Cost (UPC) is modeled as:
UPC = Initial UPC ∗ EffRemRes ∗ EffRemRez (A.25)
Finally, Production Capacity Cost (ProdCapCost) is a function of remaining
reserves.
ProdCapCost = Initial ProdCapCost ∗ EffRemRez (A.26)
A.1.6 Investment in Exploration and Production Sectors
In equilibrium, the industry is assumed to invest in order to replace the
discarded reserves.
reserve replacement inv. = UPC ∗ Production Rate (A.27)
The return on investment, the supply-demand balance and the R/P ratio affect
the actual rate of investment, i.e. whether there is an expansion or contraction
in the exploration industry.
reserves expansion/contraction =
EffDemSupOnInv ∗ EffROI ∗ EffRPratio (A.28)
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When there is insufficient demand, there is no motivation to replace the dis-
carded reserves. On the other hand, when demand exceeds supply, investment
is boosted.
EffDemSupOnInv = IFTHENELSE(R > 1, R0.7, R2) (A.29)
where R = DemandSupplyRatio. The firms will investigate the expected
return on investment (ROI) to finalize their investment decision. Since this is
an aggregate model, we do not get into the details of the ROI computations.
For simplicity, the ratio of the forecasted unit price and the total unit cost is
used to compute an ROI proxy.







Finally, if the R/P ratio is high, there is less motivation to drill for new reserves.









The effect of R/P ratio on investment in exploration is:
EffRPratio = f(Relative RPratio) (A.34)
where f is described by Figure A.2. Investment in Production is analogous.
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Figure A.2: Effect of R/P Ratio
A.1.7 Technological Advancement
The presence of technological constraints that determine fraction re-
coverable and fraction discoverable are already mentioned. These limits can
be improved through investment in technology. Improvements are assumed
to occur gradually and there is a limit to maximum improvement that can
be achieved within a time unit, denoted by max improvement rate. More-
over, there is a hypothetical upper limit to technological advancements and
the closer the current technology is to this upper limit, the slower the techno-
logical improvement rate is. Once we account for these relations, it is the rate
of investment in technology that determines the technological improvement
rate. This unrestricted rate that can be achieved with a certain investment
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level is formulated as:
IndicatedEffInvOnProdTech =
max{1, (InvestmentInProdTech/refInv)f} (A.35)
Yet, of course, these improvements can only occur after a certain lag, which is
modeled as a first-order delay. The actual “unrestricted” effect of investment
on technology per unit time is represented by “Effect of Investment on Pro-
duction Technology” and “Effect of Investment on Exploration Technology”
EffInvOnProdTech =
SMOOTH(IndicatedEffInvOnProdTech, adjT ime) (A.36)
The change in fraction recoverable (frRec) is formulated as:
improvement in prod. tech. =
(1− frRec) ∗maxImprovRate ∗ EffInvOnProdTech (A.37)
Notice that this formulation guarantees a slower rate of improvement for a
given level of investment once we are close to the technological limits. The
formulation for fraction discoverable is analogous.
A.2 The Project Model
Firm’s capacity acquisition is modeled as a third-order delay. Alter-
native Energy Capacity (AEC) increases as new capacity is acquired and de-
creases as the existing capacity depreciates. A first-order delay structure is
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used to represent the rate of depreciation.
AECDepreciation = AEC/average life of capacity (A.38)
The firm generates electricity at a rate proportional to its installed capac-
ity. Alternative energy technologies like wind and CSP are intermittent; their
availability varies in time. The productivity of a wind plant is measured by
the capacity factor. Capacity factor (CF) is the ratio of the actual (average)
production over the maximum energy the plant would have produced if it had
run at full capacity for the whole year. The average capacity factor for wind
plants is around 30%. Even though, this average level is known, the actual
capacity is stochastic depending on the volatility of wind. Volatility of wind is
modeled as a pink noise (autocorrelated noise): White noise is filtered through
an exponential smoothing with the correlation time Ts.
wind volatility = SMOOTH(N(1, σ2), Ts) (A.39)
The actual CF is:
CF = AverageCF ∗ wind volatility (A.40)
Hence the average monthly electricity generation rate (ElecGenRate) is given
by:
ElecGenRate = AEC ∗ hoursInMonth ∗ CF (A.41)
The supplier enjoys a reduction in its installation costs as the firm acquires
more capacity. Hence, the more the generating firm invests, the lower the
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costs it will face in his future investments. The supplier also takes some
advantage of global technological improvements, which is approximated as
the impact of a “global” capacity acquisition level (GlobalCapAcq). Learning
rate is approximated as the sum of the capacity acquisition by the firm and
the additional learning through global capacity acquisition adjusted with the
weight of global learning:
LearningRate = CapacityAcquisition+ (A.42)
GlobalCapAcq ∗ weight of global learning
Global capacity acquisition (GlobalCapAcq) is a function of electricity price
and investment costs. As electricity price increases or as the cost of capacity
decreases, alternative energy technologies become more competitive. Hence,
their global acquisition increases.
GlobalCapAcq =






EffInvCosts = (InvCostUnitCap/InitialCapCost)−0.4 (A.45)
The steepness of the learning curve is one of the major uncertainties underlying
the alternative energy capacity investment problem. In the literature, learning
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curve is modeled as:
InvCostUnitCap = I ∗ Z−σ (A.46)
where I is the initial capacity cost, σ is the learning index and Z is the cumu-
lative capacity. Learning index is obtained from the progress ratio, PR, which
is empirically determined from the rate of cost reduction whenever cumulative
capacity doubles.
1− PR = 2−σ (A.47)
The formulation is slightly modified in the model. First, the learning curve







Second, it is assumed that investment cost cannot fall below a certain level,
min cost. Hence, cost of capacity at time t is calculated as:
InvCostUnitCap = max{min cost, InitialInvCost ∗ LCM} (A.49)
Cash flow structure works as follows. Revenues accrue from electricity gener-
ation.
RevenuePerMonth = ElectricityPrice ∗ ElecGenRate (A.50)
Electricity price dynamics largely follow gas price dynamics. Hence, we pre-
ferred using the following simple representation: Electricity price is at its refer-
ence level when gas price is at its reference level. When gas price increases, so
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does the electricity price (as natural gas is the second most prominent energy
source used in electricity generation), but not necessarily linearly.
ElectricityPrice = refElectricityPrice ∗ EffGasPrice (A.51)
where
EffGasPrice = (GasPrice/refGasPrice)a (A.52)
Investment costs incur when new capacity is purchased.
InvCost = InvCostUnitCap ∗ CapInvestment (A.53)
The firm incurs fixed operating and maintenance cost, which is a function of
Alternative Energy Capacity; and variable costs that are a function of electric-
ity generation. The firm also pays the lease rate and taxes. Cost parameters
are assumed to be constant and deterministic.
NetProfitRate = RevenuePerMonth+ PTC (A.54)
−tax− V ariableCosts− FixedOMcosts− LeaseRate
Computation of the PTC is slightly involved. If the firm acquires ca-
pacity before the expiration date of the PTC, it is eligible for a credit amount
of 1.5 c/kwh tax credit for a credit duration of 10 years. If the tax the firm
has to pay is less than the Tax Benefit, the credit is provided for the amount
of the tax due. To determine the Tax Benefit at a certain time t, the model
checks if the PTC expired for the initial investment and for the expansion
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investments separately. Because, it might be the case that the credit for the
initial investment expired but the credit for the expansion investments have
not expired yet; or, the initial investments might occur before the PTC offi-
cially expired yet the expansion investments miss that opportunity. If only a
part of the electricity generation is eligible for the PTC, the model computes
that ratio of revenues that are eligible for the credit. Finally, note that the




Platform Performance Investment in the
Presence of Network Externalities
B.1 Price-Taker Duopoly: Characterization
For the simultaneous-move game described in Section 4.1, the unre-
stricted platform performance decision at equilibrium is given by
φPT =
mpvφ − γ(tβg − βc(αg − γ))
βgγvφ − 4Kχ
Since the constraint φ ≥ 0 is not enforced to obtain this equilibrium, we restrict
the parameter space below such that the constraint is trivially satisfied. Note
that game developers’ margin αg − γ and platform sponsors’ adjusted margin
mp = p − c + γ(1 −M) are assumed to be nonnegative whereas developers’
fixed cost of joining a platform M is assumed to be less than 1, as explained
in Section 3 and Section 4.1 respectively. We first divide the parameter space
into the following regions:
Region 1: vφ ≥ 0 and χ ≤ 0
Region 2: vφ ≤ 0 and χ ≥ 0
Region 3: vφ ≥ 0 and χ ≥ 0
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Region 4: vφ ≤ 0 and χ ≤ 0
Next, we exclude Region 3 and Region 4 by showing that under these
cases the developer market share Ni, i = 1, 2 becomes negative.
Lemma B.1.1. Region 3 and Region 4 are eliminated.
Proof. We first show that in Region 3 the developer market share becomes
negative at equilibrium and eliminate this region from analysis. Consider a
market where vφ = βc− αcβg ≥ 0 and χ = αc(αg − γ)− t ≥ 0. First note that
χ = αc(αg − γ)− t ≥ 0 implies
tβg − βc(αg − γ) ≤ αc(αg − γ)βg − βc(αg − γ) = (αcβg − βc)(αg − γ)
= −vφ(αg − γ) ≤ 0
Hence, the numerator of φPT is positive under the assumption mp = p − c +
γ(1−M) ≥ 0. Accordingly, the condition φPT ≥ 0 requires
βgγvφ − 4Kχ ≥ 0 (B.1)
Developer market share at equilibrium is given by
N = 1−M + αg − γ
2
− βgφPT
Hence, the following condition is necessary for developers to enter the market.
N = 1−M + αg − γ
2
− βg




We want to show that when vφ ≥ 0 and χ ≥ 0, (B.2) does not hold. Note that
(B.2) implies
βg
mpvφ − γ(tβg − βc(αg − γ))
βgγvφ − 4Kχ
≤ 1−M + αg − γ
2
Since the denominator of the left hand side is positive by (B.1), we can rewrite
the above inequality as
βgvφ(p− c+ γ(1−M))− βgγ(tβg − βc(αg − γ))
≤ (1−M)βgγvφ − (1−M)4Kχ+
(αg − γ)βgγvφ
2
− 2Kχ(αg − γ)
Eliminating the term (1−M)βgγvφ from both sides of the inequality yields
(p− c)βgvφ − βgγ(tβg − βc(αg − γ))
≤ −(1−M)4Kχ+ (αg − γ)βgγvφ
2
− 2Kχ(αg − γ)
By substituting vφ = βc − αcβg and rearranging the terms, we get
(p− c)βgvφ −
(αg − γ)βgγ(βc − αcβg)
2
− β2gγt+ βgγβc(αg − γ)
≤ −(1−M)4Kχ− 2Kχ(αg − γ)






≤ −(1−M)4Kχ− 2Kχ(αg − γ)






≤ −(1−M)4Kχ− 2Kχ(αg − γ)
The right hand side of the last inequality is negative under the aforementioned
assumptions χ ≥ 0, M < 1, αg − γ ≥ 0. Hence, the left hand side has to be
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negative. We add and subtract the term
β2gγαc(αg−γ)
2
from the left hand side to
get
(p− c)βgvφ − β2gγt+
βgγβc(αg − γ)
2
+ β2gγαc(αg − γ)−
β2gγαc(αg − γ)
2
Rearranging the terms and substituting χ = αc(αg − γ)− t yields












= (p− c)βgvφ + β2gγχ+
βgγ(αg − γ)(βc − βgαc)
2




If the sign of (B.3) is positive, then (B.2) gives a contradiction. The first and
the third term of (B.3) are positive since vφ ≥, whereas the second term is
positive since χ ≥ 0. This contradicts (B.2). Hence we exclude Region 3 from
our analysis. The same result can be shown to hold for Region 4 with a similar
proof.
By excluding Regions 3 and 4, we restrict the parameter space to Re-
gions 1 and 2. In other words, throughout Section 3.4.1.1 we assume that
vφχ = (βc − αcβg)(αc(αg − γ)− t) ≤ 0 (B.4)
Next, we restrict Regions 1 and 2 so that φPT ≥ 0 is satisfied.
Region 1: vφ ≥ 0 and χ ≤ 0.
In this case, the denominator is always positive. A sufficient condition to make
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the numerator negative is a high enough mp. In particular,
mp ≥
γ(tβg − βc(αg − γ))
vφ
(B.5)
This sufficient condition is hardly restrictive when the competition in the end-
user market is intense, i.e. when t is small. Our initial assumption mp ≥ 0
usually satisfies the condition in that case. In a market with well-differentiated
platforms, however, mp ≥ 0 may not be enough to guarantee a nonnegative
equilibrium value for the platform performance, especially when βc is relatively
small compared to αc (i.e vφ ≤ 0.). In other words, we see that in a competitive
market a small margin may be enough to motivate the platform sponsor invest
in platform performance. However, once the platforms are well-differentiated,
a higher margin is required for positive investment in platform performance,
especially if end-users’ utility from content availability exceeds their utility
from platform performance.
Region 2: vφ ≤ 0 and χ ≥ 0.
In this case, the denominator is always negative. Just as in Region 1, a suffi-
cient condition to make the numerator negative is a high enough mp.
mpvφ − γ(tβg − βc(αg − γ)) ≤ 0
⇔ mp ≥
γ(tβg − βc(αg − γ))
vφ
The second inequality follows from the fact that vφ ≤ 0.
Throughout the analysis, we assume that the end-user market is cov-
ered. To satisfy this assumption, the net utility of the marginal end-user that
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is indifferent between the two platforms must be nonnegative. Note that in the
Hotelling model this marginal end-user is “farthest” away from the platform
he is affiliated with. Accordingly, the net utility of the marginal end-user from
purchasing platform i, i = 1, 2 is given by
umi = αcNi + βcφi − p− tDi (B.6)
At equilibrium, the end-user market is split equally between the platforms.
Substituting (B.2) for Ni, 1/2 for Di, and φ
PT for φi
um = αc(1−M + 1/2(αg − γ)− βgφPT ) + βcφPT − p− t/2
Rearranging the terms we get
um = αc(1−M + 1/2(αg − γ)) + (βc − αcβg)φPT − p− t/2
= αc(1−M + 1/2(αg − γ)) + vφφPT − p− t/2
= αc(1−M) + vφφPT − p+ χ/2 (B.7)
Market coverage assumption requires (B.7) to be nonnegative. In other words
we need
p− χ/2 ≤ αc(1−M) + vφφPT (B.8)
Note that low M and high αc makes it likely that the market coverage
assumption (B.8) to be satisfied. Further, low M implies a higher mp, which
helps to satisfy (B.5) as well.
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Finally, sufficient conditions for optimality require the following deriva-
tive to be nonpositive.
∂Π2
∂2φ
= −2K + vφγ(βg(χ− t) + βc(αg − γ))
2χ2
(B.9)
Note that the denominator of the second term is always positive. Accordingly,
to satisfy the sufficient condition for optimality, K (platform development cost
per unit performance squared) must be sufficiently high. In particular,
K ≥ vφγ(βg(χ− t) + βc(αg − γ))
4χ2
(B.10)
To sum up, throughout Section 4.1 we assume that the parameters
satisfy (B.4), (B.5),(B.8) and (B.10) together with the initial assumptions
αg − γ ≥ 0, M < 1 and mp ≥ 0.
B.2 Price-Setting Duopoly: Characterization
We see that at equilibrium the platforms play one of the two pooling
strategies described in Lemma 3.4.2 depending on the market parameters. In
particular, either both platforms make zero investment in platform perfor-
mance or they make a positive investment and adjust the price accordingly.
We first characterize the parameter region where the high performance equi-
librium holds. Naturally, the first condition is
βc ≥ βg(αc + γ) (B.11)
146





−2t+ (αg − γ)(2αc + γ)




= −2K + γvφ(−2tβg + (βc + αcβg)(αg − γ))










4K(2t− (αg − γ)(2αc + γ))− v2PS
4(t− αc(αg − γ))2
≥ 0 (B.14)
From (B.14), the following necessary condition arises




Note that when (B.15) is satisfied, so is (B.12) because (B.15) implies that the
numerator of (B.12) is negative. Further, a significantly high platform differen-
tiation guarantees to satisfy (B.13). To see this, note that vφ = βc− βgαc ≥ 0
due to the fact that vPS is positive. Hence, if t is high enough to make the
second term (−2tβg + (βc + αcβg)(αg − γ)) negative, (B.13) is satisfied. Note
that this is only a sufficient condition. Even if t is not high enough, (B.13)
would still be satisfied with a sufficiently high K.





− c− 3/2 t
+ αc(1−M + 3/2 (αg − γ)) + γ(1−M + αg − γ) ≥ 0 (B.16)
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This condition puts an upperbound on t and c. In particular,




+ αc(1−M + 3/2 (αg − γ)) + γ(1−M + αg − γ) (B.17)
Accordingly, throughout Section 4.2 we assume that (B.13), (B.15) and (B.17)
are satisfied, together with our initial assumptions M < 1 and αg − γ ≥ 0.
B.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1.




−χ(β2gγ2 + 4K(mp + γ(αg − γ)))
[−4Kχ+ βgγvφ]2
(B.18)
It is easy to see that (B.18) is nonpositive if χ ≥ 0 under the assumption
mp ≥ 0. By Lemma B.1.1, χ ≥ 0 also requires vφ ≤ 0 concluding the
proof.
ii) Note that the degree of competition in a market increases when t, the
product differentiation between the platforms, decreases. Hence, it suf-





−vφ(β2gγ2 + 4K(mp + γ(αg − γ)))
[−4Kχ+ βgγvφ]2
(B.19)
The denominator of (B.19) is trivially positive. The numerator is positive
when vφ ≤ 0 under the assumption mp ≥ 0. By Lemma B.1.1, vφ ≤ 0
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also requires χ ≥ 0, concluding the proof. Hence, when vφ is negative
and χ is positive, platform performance decreases with increasing degree
of competition.





2 + 4Kαcmp + 4Ktγ)
[−4Kχ+ βgγvφ]2
(B.20)
The denominator of (B.20) is trivially positive. The numerator is nega-
tive if vφ ≤ 0 under the assumption mp ≥ 0, in which case the optimal
performance decreases with the game price αg. By Lemma B.1.1, vφ ≤ 0
also requires χ ≥ 0, concluding the proof.




(tβg − βc(αg − γ))(β2gγ2 + 4K(mp + γ(αg − γ)))
[−4Kχ+ βgγvφ]2
(B.21)
It is easy to see that (B.21) is nonnegative when tβg − βc(αg − γ) ≤ 0
under the assumption mp ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3. First note that when vPS = βc − βg(αc +
γ) ≤ 0, both platforms choose the minimum platform performance which is
assumed to be zero. In that case, equilibrium performance is insensitive to
changes in market parameters as long as vPS stays negative. On the other
hand, when vPS ≥ 0, platforms play the high performance equilibrium and set
φPSH = vPS/4K.
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On the other hand, if vPS ≤ 0, equilibrium performance does not change
with βc unless the increase in βc makes vPS positive in which case equi-
librium performance increases. Hence, equilibrium performance is non-
decreasing in βc.
ii) An increase in αc further decreases vPS. Hence, if vPS ≤ 0, platform
performance does not change when αc increases. On the other hand, if





Hence, equilibrium performance is nonincreasing in αc.
iii) An increase in γ further decreases vPS. Hence, if vPS ≤ 0, platform
performance does not change when γ increases. On the other hand, if





iv) An increase in βg further decreases vPS. Hence, if vPS ≤ 0, platform
performance does not change when βg increases. On the other hand, if
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= −(αc + γ)/4K
v) It is easy to see that ∂φPSH /∂t = ∂φ
PS
L /∂t = 0
Proof of Proposition 3.4.4. Consider two symmetric platforms simul-
taneously entering the market. By substituting the equilibrium values for
φPS, pPS, NPS and DPS into the profit function (3.6), profit earned by each










Similarly, if vφχ ≤ 0, profit earned by each platform in a price-taker
duopoly is given by




1/4γ(2(1−M) + αg − γ − 2βg
mpvφ − γ(tβg − βc(αg − γ))
βgγvφ − 4Kχ
) (B.23)
whereas if vφχ > 0,
πPT =
2(p− c) + γ(2(1−M) + αg − γ)
4
(B.24)
where vφ = βc − αcβg, χ = αc(αg − γ)− t and mp = p− c+ γ(1−M).
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0 vφχ > 0
(B.26)
First, we look at the price-setting duopoly. If vPS < 0, profit is insensi-
tive to changes in βc. When vPS ≥ 0, the numerator of (B.25) is nega-
tive. Since the denominator is trivially positive, this implies ∂πPS/∂βc
is negative. In other words, in a price setting duopoly if the end-users’
utility from platform performance increases the profit of each platform
decreases.
Next, we look at the price-taker duopoly. If vφχ > 0, φ
PT = 0 and
from B.26 profit is insensitive to changes in βc. On the other hand,
when vφχ ≤ 0, the numerator of (B.26) is always negative. If vφ ≤ 0,
then χ ≥ 0; in which case the denominator also becomes negative, mak-
ing (B.26) positive. Hence, in a content-driven market characterized by
vφ ≤ 0 and χ ≥ 0, the profit of a price-taker platform may actually in-
crease when the end-users’ utility from platform performance increases.














0 vφχ > 0
(B.28)
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Trivially from (B.27), the profit of a price-setting platform always in-
creases when t increases, in other words, when the degree of competition
decreases. To see that πPT may actually increase when the degree of
competition decreases, i.e. that (B.28) may be negative, first note that
the numerator is trivially positive. By (B.4), we know that vφχ ≤ 0.
This implies that if vφ ≤ 0, then χ ≥ 0; in which case the denomina-
tor becomes negative. Hence in a content-driven market characterized
by vφ ≤ 0 and χ ≥ 0, the profit a price-taker platform may actually
increase when the degree of competition increases, concluding the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.5.
i) In Proposition 3.4.3, we have shown that φPS decreases with βg. It








0 vPS < 0
(B.29)
It is easy to see that for vPS ≥ 0 the numerator of (B.29) is positive
when βc − 2βg(αc + γ) > 0, in which case pPS increases with βg even
though φPS decreases.
ii) In Proposition 3.4.3, we have shown that φPS decreases with γ when










αc + 2γ − 1 +M − αg) vPS < 0
(B.30)
When βg(βc− βg(αc + 2γ)) ≥ 4K(1−M −αc +αg − 2γ), the numerator
of (B.30) is positive in which case pPS increases with γ even though φPS
decreases.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1. Let Platform 1 be the leader and Platform
2 the follower. An analysis of the first order conditions yield the equilibrium
values of platform performances as follows:
φPSseq1 =
−vPS(v2PS +K(2(αg − γ)(3αc + 2γ)− 6t))
2K(−3v2PS + 4K(4t− (αg − γ)(4αc + 3γ)))
(B.31)
φPSseq2 =
−vPS(v2PS +K((αg − γ)(5αc + 4γ)− 5t))
K(−3v2PS + 4K(4t− (αg − γ)(4αc + 3γ)))
(B.32)














(3v2PS − 4K(4t− (αg − γ)(4αc + 3γ)))2




v2φ + 4Kγαg − 2βgγvφ + γ2(β2g − 4K)






v2φ + 4Kγαg − 2βgγvφ + γ2(β2g − 4K)





Dual Sourcing under Random Supply
Capacities:
The Role of the Inferior Supplier
Theorem C.0.1. For each t, the following results hold.
i) The objective function Jt(I; qf , qs) is continuous in (I, qf , qs) and the
optimal cost function Vt(I) is continuous in I.
ii) The optimal cost function Vt(I) <∞ and limI→±∞ Vt(I) =∞
iii) For each I, there exist finite upper bounds on the optimal qf and qs that
minimize Jt(I; qf , qs).
Proof. Part i) follows from a simple inductive argument together with the
fact that the one-period cost function is continuous in (I, qf , qs).





















The first inequality follows from the fact that the optimal cost in period t is less
than the cost incurred by ordering nothing over the periods t to T . The second
inequality follows from the assumption that |Ht(x1) −Ht(x2)| ≤ cH |x1 − x2|.
The last inequality follows from the assumption that EDt is finite for each t.
The result that limI→±∞ Vt(I) =∞ follows directly from the assumption that
limI→±∞H(I) =∞, proving Part ii).
Part iii) follows directly from part ii).
Lemma C.0.2. Let φ(q) be a convex function minimized at q = q̃ and let
k, ka and kb be identically distributed nonnegative random variables. For any
given θ ∈ [0, 1] with θ̄ = 1− θ, we have the following relations.
i) If ka and kb are independent, then
Eφ(q̃ ∧ k) ≥ min
qa≥0,qb≥0
{Eφ(θ(qa ∧ ka) + θ̄(qb ∧ kb))}.
ii) If ka = kb = k almost surely, then for any choice of (qa, qb),
Eφ(q̃ ∧ k) ≤ Eφ(θ(qa ∧ k) + θ̄(qb ∧ k)).
Proof of LemmaC.0.2. We first prove part i). When ka and kb are inde-
pendent copies of k, we have
Eφ(θ(q ∧ ka) + θ̄(q ∧ kb)) ≤ E[θφ(q ∧ ka) + θ̄φ(q ∧ kb))] = Eφ(q ∧ k).
The first inequality follows from the convexity of φ, and the second follows
from the fact that ka, kb, and k have the same distribution.
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To see part ii), consider possible realizations of k = ka = kb,
Case 1: If k < q̃, then
θ(qa ∧ k) + θ̄(qb ∧ k) ≤ k < q̃.
We must have
φ(θ(qa ∧ k) + θ̄(qb ∧ k)) ≥ φ(k) = φ(q̃ ∧ k).
Case 2: If k ≥ q̃, then by the optimality of q̃, we have
φ(θ(qa ∧ k) + θ̄(qb ∧ k)) ≥ φ(q̃) = φ(q̃ ∧ k).
Combining Cases 1 and 2, we conclude that
Eφ(θ(qa ∧ k) + θ̄(qb ∧ k)) ≥ Eφ(q̃ ∧ k).
Proof of Proposition 4.4.1. Define the cost function for realized delivery
quantities yf and ys as follows
π(I; yf , ys) = cfyf + csys + EH(I + yf −D) + αEVt+(I + yf + ys −D).
Clearly π(I; yf , ys) is jointly convex in (I, yf , ys). Also note that
Jt(I; qf , qs) = Eπ(I; qf ∧ kf , qs ∧ ks).
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Choose I1 < I2 and θ ∈ [0, 1] with θ̄ = 1 − θ. Also define I = θI1 + θ̄I2. We
have










= θEπ(I1; q∗f (I1) ∧ kf , q∗s(I1) ∧ ks) + θ̄Eπ(I2; q∗f (I2) ∧ kf , q∗s(I2) ∧ ks)
≥ Eπ(I; θ(q∗f (I1) ∧ kf ) + θ̄(q∗f (I2) ∧ kf ), θ(q∗s(I1) ∧ ks) + θ̄(q∗s(I2) ∧ ks)).
Let yf = q̃f be the minimizer of
φf (yf ) = Eπ(I; yf , θ(q∗s(I1) ∧ ks) + θ̄(q∗s(I2) ∧ ks)).
Note that the right-hand side of (C.1) is simply
Eφf (θ(q∗f (I1) ∧ kf ) + θ̄(q∗f (I2) ∧ kf )).
By Lemma C.0.2, we conclude that
Eφf (θ(q∗f (I1) ∧ kf ) + θ̄(q∗f (I2) ∧ kf )) ≥ Eφf (q̃f ∧ kf ).
Now define
φs(ys) = Eπ(I, q̃f ∧ kf , ys).
Let q̃s be the minimizer of φ
s(ys). Note that
Eφf (q̃f ∧ kf ) = Eφs(θ(q∗s(I1) ∧ ks) + θ̄(q∗s(I2) ∧ ks)).
A similar argument as the above shows that
Eφs(θ(q∗s(I1) ∧ ks) + θ̄(q∗s(I2) ∧ ks)) ≥ Eφs(q̃s ∧ ks).
159
We deduce that
θVt(I1) + θ̄Vt(I2) ≥ Eφf (q̃f ∧ kf )
≥ Eφs(q̃s ∧ ks)
= Eπ(I, q̃f ∧ kf , q̃s,∧ks)
= Jt(I; q̃f , q̃s)
≥ Vt(I).
Hence, we conclude the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.2. The proof is based on the convexity of Vt+1(·)
and H(·) and the first-order conditions for qf,t and qs,t given as follows:
∂Jt
∂qf,t
= φf,t(I, qf,t, qs,t)Ḡf (qf,t) = 0, (C.2)
∂Jt
∂qs,t
= φs,t(I, qf,t, qs,t)Ḡs(qs,t) = 0, (C.3)
where Gj,t(·) is the distribution of kj,t with Ḡj,t(x) = 1−Gj,t(x), j = f, s and
φf,t(I, qf,t, qs,t) = cf + EH ′(I + qf,t −D) + αEV ′t+1(I + qf,t + qs,t ∧ ks −D),
φs,t(I, qf,t, qs,t) = cs + αEV ′t+1(I + qf,t ∧ kf + qs,t −D).




f,t(I − δ). The first-order condition with respect to qf,t requires:
0 ≥ φf (I; q∗f,t(I), q∗s,t(I))− φf (I − δ; q∗f,t(I − δ), q∗s,t(I − δ)) (C.4)
= EH ′(I + q∗f,t(I)−D)− EH ′(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ)−D)
+αmax{EV ′t+1(I + q∗f,t(I)−D), A(I)}
−αmax{EV ′t+1(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ)−D), A(I − δ)}
where
A(I) = Emin{EV ′t+1(I + q∗f,t(I) + q∗s,t(I)−D),EV ′t+1(I + q∗f,t(I) + ks −D)}
Note that by the convexity of H(·) and Vt+1(·), the assumption q∗f,t(I) >
q∗f,t(I − δ) implies:
EH ′(I + q∗f,t(I)−D)− EH ′(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ)−D) ≥ 0
EV ′t+1(I + q∗f,t(I)−D) ≥ EV ′t+1(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ)−D)
EV ′t+1(I + q∗f,t(I) + ks −D) ≥ EV ′t+1(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ) + ks −D)
Hence, to satisfy (C.4), the following must hold:
EV ′t+1(I + q∗f,t(I) + q∗s,t(I)−D)
≤ EV ′t+1(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ) + q∗s,t(I − δ)−D) (C.5)
By the convexity of Vt+1(·), this is equivalent to
q∗f,t(I) + q
∗
s,t(I) ≤ q∗f,t(I − δ) + q∗s,t(I − δ)− δ (C.6)
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Note that if q∗s,t(I) ≥ q∗s,t(I − δ), C.6 would be a contradiction under the
assumption q∗f,t(I) > q
∗
f,t(I − δ). Now consider the first-order condition with
respect to the slow order qs,t(I).
0 ≤ φs(I, q∗f,t(I), q∗s,t(I))− φs(I − δ, q∗f,t(I − δ), q∗s,t(I − δ)) (C.7)
= αmax{EV ′t+1(I + q∗s,t(I)−D), B(I)}
−αmax{EV ′t+1(I − δ + q∗s,t(I − δ)−D), B(I − δ)}
where
B(I) = Emin{EV ′t+1(I + q∗f,t(I) + q∗s,t(I)−D),EV ′t+1(I + kf + q∗s,t(I)−D)}
But given (C.5), (C.7) requires
q∗s,t(I) ≥ q∗s,t(I − δ)− δ (C.8)
which contradicts (C.6) under the assumption q∗f,t(I) > q
∗
f,t(I − δ). Hence,
q∗f,t(I) ≤ q∗f,t(I− δ). We can show that q∗s,t(I) ≤ q∗s,t(I− δ) in a similar fashion.
Next, we show that q∗j,t(I− δ)− q∗j,t(I) ≤ δ, j = f, s. First, assume that
q∗f,t(I−δ)−δ > q∗f,t(I). Note that under this assumption φf (I; q∗f,t(I), q∗s,t(I))−
φf (I − δ; q∗f,t(I − δ) ≥ 0. Further, by the convexity of H(·) and Vt+1(·), the
assumption implies:
EH ′(I + q∗f,t(I)−D) ≤ EH ′(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ)−D)
EV ′t+1(I + q∗f,t(I)−D)} ≤ EV ′t+1(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ)−D)}
EV ′t+1(I + q∗f,t(I) + ks −D)} ≤ EV ′t+1(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ) + ks −D)}
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s,t(I))− φf (I − δ; q∗f,t(I − δ) ≥ 0 to hold, the following
condition must be satisfied:




s,t(I) ≥ q∗f,t(I − δ) + q∗s,t(I − δ)− δ (C.9)
Since we assumed that q∗f,t(I−δ)−δ > q∗f,t(I), (C.9) requires q∗s,t(I) > q∗s,t(I−δ),
a contradiction because q∗s,t(I) ≤ q∗s,t(I − δ). Hence, q∗f,t(I − δ) ≤ q∗f,t(I) + δ.
We can show that q∗s,t(I − δ) ≤ q∗s,t(I) + δ in a similar fashion.
Finally, we show that q∗f,t(I−δ)+q∗s,t(I−δ) ≥ q∗f,t(I)+q∗s,t(I)+δ. First
consider q∗f,t(I) > 0. Note that since q
∗
f,t(I − δ) − δ ≤ q∗f,t(I), the following
relations hold:
EH ′(I + q∗f,t(I)−D)− EH ′(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ)−D) ≥ 0
EV ′t+1(I + q∗f,t(I)−D) ≥ EV ′t+1(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ)−D)
EV ′t+1(I + q∗f,t(I) + ks −D) ≥ EV ′t+1(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ) + ks −D)




s,t(I)) = φf (I−δ; q∗f,t(I−δ), q∗s,t(I−δ)),
the following must hold:




s,t(I) ≤ q∗f,t(I − δ) + q∗s,t(I − δ)− δ
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Now consider q∗f,t(I) = 0. Since I ≤ max{If,t, Is,t}, we have q∗s,t(I) > 0. By
the first order condition for qs,t(I)
αEV ′t+1(I + q∗s,t(I)−D) = EV ′t+1(I − δ + q∗f,t(I − δ) ∧ kf + q∗s,t(I − δ)−D)






f,t(I) ≤ q∗f,t(I − δ) + q∗s,t(I − δ)− δ
concluding the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.3.
We first prove part i). Suppose the result is not true and thus If,t < Is,t.
We have q∗f,t(If,t) = 0 and q
∗
s,t(If,t) > 0. Since If,t is the re-order point, we




cf − p+ (h+ p)F (If,t) + αEV ′t+1(If,t + q∗s,t(If,t) ∧ ks −D) = 0,
where F (·) is the distribution function for the demand D. By the first-order
condition of qs,t(I), we have
φs,t(If,t, 0, q
∗
s,t(If,t)) = cs + αEV ′t+1(If,t + q∗s,t(If,t)−D) = 0.
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Furthermore, we note that
αEV ′t+1(If,t + q∗s,t(If,t) ∧ ks −D)
= αEks min{EDV ′t+1(If,t + q∗s,t(If,t)−D),EDV ′t+1(If,t + ks −D)}
= αEks min{−cs/α,EDV ′t+1(If,t + ks −D)}
≤ −cs,
where EX represents the expectation with respect to the random variable X.
Substituting the above relation in (C.10),
cf − p+ (h+ p)F (If,t)− cs ≥ 0
Hence, we deduce that
F (If,t) ≥
p− cf + cs
h+ p
.
Since If,t < Is,t, If,t must be bounded. We must have F (If,t) ≤ 1. This,
in turn, implies that cs ≤ cf + h, which contradicts the condition in part i).
Hence, we must have If,t ≥ Is,t.
To see part ii) suppose the result is not true and thus If,t > Is,t. We have
q∗s,t(Is,t) = 0 and q
∗
f,t(Is,t) > 0. Since Is,t is the re-order point, we have from
the first-order condition of qs,t(I) that
φs,t(Is,t, q
∗
f,t(Is,t), 0) = cs + αEV ′t+1(Is,t + q∗f,t(Is,t) ∧ kf −D) = 0. (C.11)




cf − p+ (h+ p)F (Is,t + q∗f,t(Is,t)) + αEV ′t+1(Is,t + q∗f,t(Is,t)−D) = 0,
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Furthermore, we note that
αEV ′t+1(Is,t + q∗f,t(Is,t) ∧ kf −D)
= Ekf min{αEDV ′t+1(Is,t + q∗f,t(Is,t)−D), αEDV ′t+1(Is,t + kf −D)}
= Ekf min{−cf + p− (h+ p)F (Is,t + q∗f,t(Is,t)), αEDV ′t+1(Is,t + kf −D)}
≤ −cf + p− (h+ p)F (Is,t + q∗f,t(Is,t))
Substituting the above relation in (C.11),
cs − cf + p− (h+ p)F (Is,t + q∗f,t(Is,t)) ≥ 0
Hence, we deduce that
F (Is,t + q
∗
f,t(Is,t)) ≤
cs − cf + p
h+ p
.
By definition, we must have F (Is,t + q
∗
f,t(Is,t)) ≥ 0. This, in turn, implies that
cf ≤ p+ cs, which contradicts the condition in part ii). Hence, we must have
If,t ≤ Is,t.
Remark C.0.1. We consider the case when the fast supplier has an L-period
leadtime and the slow one has an L+1-period leadtime.To ensure tractability,
we make a simplifying assumption that the supplier capacities are observed
one period after the corresponding orders are placed. In other words, kf,t
and ks,t are realized at the end of period t when the demand Dt materializes.
In this case, the total available inventory at the beginning of period t before
orders qf,t and qs,t are issued, i.e., the pre-order inventory position, is
yt = It +
t−1∑
n=t−L+1





Note that kf,n and ks,n, n < t, are constants in period t on account of our
assumption. It is easily seen that yt follows the following dynamics:
yt+1 = yt + qf,t ∧ kf,t + qs,t ∧ ks,t −Dt.
The amount of net inventory at the beginning of period t+L before the order
qf,t arrives is
It+L = yt −D(L),
whereD(L) is the Lth-fold convolution ofD. Thus, the objective of the problem
becomes
Jt(y; qf,t, qs,t) = cfE(qf,t ∧ kf ) + csE(qs,t ∧ ks) + αL−1EH(y + qf,t ∧ kf −D(L))
+αLEVt+L(y + qf,t ∧ kf + qs,t ∧ ks −D(L)).
It is easily shown that all the results derived earlier for the case L = 0 can be
generalized to any positive L.
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